Pace University

DigitalCommons@Pace
Pace Law Faculty Publications

School of Law

2013

Privacy Laws and Privacy Levers: Online Surveillance Versus
Economic Development in the People’s Republic of China
Ann Bartow
Pace Law School

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/lawfaculty
Part of the Comparative and Foreign Law Commons, and the Intellectual Property Law Commons

Recommended Citation
Ann Bartow, Privacy Laws and Privacy Levers: Online Surveillance Versus Economic Development in the
People’s Republic of China, 74 Ohio St. L.J. 853 (2013), http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/lawfaculty/922.

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the School of Law at DigitalCommons@Pace. It has been
accepted for inclusion in Pace Law Faculty Publications by an authorized administrator of DigitalCommons@Pace.
For more information, please contact dheller2@law.pace.edu.

Privacy Laws and Privacy Levers: Online
Surveillance Versus Economic Development in the
People’s Republic of China
ANN BARTOW*
TABLE OF CONTENTS
I. INTRODUCTION ................................................................................. 853
II. PRIVACY LAW AND PRAXIS IN CHINA ............................................... 854
A. China’s Government, Legal System, and Privacy
Control ................................................................................... 856
B. Consumers and Commercial Tracking ................................... 862
III. PRIVACY AND POLITICAL AMBIVALENCE.......................................... 865
A. Little Anonymity for Anyone Online or Off ............................. 866
B. Communitarian Concerns ....................................................... 869
C. Individual Concerns ................................................................ 882
IV. CENSORSHIP, COUNTERFEITING AND CONSUMER PRIVACY .............. 884
A. Chinese Censorship Affects Film Content Worldwide ............ 886
B. Uploading, Downloading and Piratical Diversions ............... 889
V. THE APPEARANCE OF CONFLICT MEETS THE APPEARANCE OF
FORCE ............................................................................................... 891
VI. CONCLUSION ..................................................................................... 893
I. INTRODUCTION
This Essay describes and contextualizes the ongoing efforts by the
Communist Party of China (CPC) to reconcile two dramatically competing
interests: the desire to extensively monitor the communications of its citizenry,
and a burning ambition to further develop its banking and financial industries,
its high tech innovation capabilities, and its overall share of the “knowledge
economy.”
Monitoring and censoring communications, especially via “one-to-many”
social networking platforms, is viewed as essential for the prevention of mass
anti-Party political activities ranging from peaceful civil disobedience to armed
insurrection and for the protection of the reputations of individual Party leaders.
Mobile Internet technologies make electronic surveillance easier, but effective
monitoring harder, as keeping track of the content and importance of individual
* Professor of Law, Pace Law School, Pace University. I have traveled extensively in
mainland China and in Hong Kong, and spent the 2011–2012 academic year as a Fulbright
Scholar at Tongji University Law School in Shanghai, China. While I can speak very
rudimentary conversational Chinese, the information in this essay was obtained exclusively
through English language sources. Some of the assertions are based on conversations I had
with Chinese judges, lawyers, students and business people.
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communications requires time and trustworthy judgment calls that cannot be
automated or outsourced.
While unbounded surveillance may be a useful tool for keeping control of
political subdivisions, it can be very bad for business. Companies want to
protect their trade secrets, and control access to their financial data and other
proprietary information, and they want to engage in confidential
communications. Businesses also want access to the same information and
Internet resources as their competitors abroad. The people running China would
like to attract and retain all manner of sophisticated business ventures, but
simultaneously wish to spy extensively on these companies and on the people
who run them. And the Internet access that is generally available is censored
and ponderously slow due to the extensive monitoring and filtering technologies
that are in place.
The CPC probably can’t have it both ways. If secure communication
channels are not consistently available to private sector businesses within
China, enterprises that value or require confidentiality will limit their in-country
transactions. Some foreign companies may avoid doing business there
altogether. But permitting credibly unmonitored and unfiltered communications
on a scale commensurate with the size of the business community in China will
not be a step the CPC takes lightly. Monitoring and censoring communications,
especially via “one-to-many” social networking platforms, is viewed as
essential for the prevention of mass anti-Party political activities ranging from
peaceful civil disobedience to armed insurrection; and to protect the reputations
of individual Party leaders.

II. PRIVACY LAW AND PRAXIS IN CHINA
China is often externally perceived as a nation with an autocratic
government that does not permit its citizens any realistic expectation of personal
privacy. Yet just as Western conceptions of privacy differ across variables such
as age, gender, social class, and other factors, there may be an even wider range
of variation in China, given its long and complicated history, geographical
range, enormous population, and substantial ethnic diversity.1 As of 2005 there
were more than 200 laws or regulations in China that mentioned privacy in
some form.2 At the level of written laws and regulations China’s approach to
privacy is actually far more robust and somewhat less incoherent than that of
the United States. There is no need to search the Chinese Constitution for
textual privacy penumbras or emanations.3 This document, which took effect in
1 Bonnie S. McDougall, Particulars and Universals: Studies on Chinese Privacy, in
CHINESE CONCEPTS OF PRIVACY 3, 4 (Bonnie S. McDougall & Anders Hansson eds., 2002).
2 Cao Jingchun, Protecting the Right to Privacy in China, 36 VICTORIA U.
WELLINGTON L. REV. 645, 646 (2005).
3 See Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 484 (1965) (“The foregoing cases
suggest that specific guarantees in the Bill of Rights have penumbras, formed by emanations
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1982, explicitly establishes a right of personal dignity that prohibits insults, libel
and defamation, a right to be free of unlawful searches or intrusion into the
home, and a right of freedom and privacy with respect to personal
correspondence.4 Of particular relevance to the topic of this essay is Article 40,
which states:
Freedom and privacy of correspondence of citizens of the People’s
Republic of China are protected by law. No organization or individual may, on
any ground, infringe upon the freedom and privacy of citizens’ correspondence
except in cases where, to meet the needs of state security or of investigation
into criminal offences, public security or procuratorial organs are permitted to
censor correspondence in accordance with procedures prescribed by law.5

China’s General Civil Code (1986) also contains several provisions that
relate to privacy concerns, including:
Article 99. Citizens shall enjoy the right of personal name and shall be
entitled to determine, use or change their personal names in accordance with
relevant provisions. Interference with, usurpation of and false representation of
personal names shall be prohibited. Legal persons, individual businesses and
individual partnerships shall enjoy the right of name. Enterprises as legal
persons, individual businesses and individual partnerships shall have the right
to use and lawfully assign their own names.
Article 100. Citizens shall enjoy the right of portrait. The use of a citizen’s
portrait for profit without his consent shall be prohibited.
Article 101. Citizens and legal persons shall enjoy the right of reputation.
The personality of citizens shall be protected by law, and the use of insults,
libel or other means to damage the reputation of citizens or legal persons shall
be prohibited.
Article 102. Citizens and legal persons shall enjoy the right of honor. It
shall be prohibited to unlawfully divest citizens and legal persons of their
honorary titles.6

The importance of Article 101 protection of “reputation rights” in particular
was emphasized by two judicial interpretations of the Supreme Court of China,
one in 1993 and another in 1998,7 and is often invoked in business litigation.8
from those guarantees that help give them life and substance. Various guarantees create
zones of privacy.” (citation omitted)).
4 XIANFA [CONSTITUTION] arts. 38, 39 (1982) (China).
5 Id. art. 40.
6 General Principles of the Civil Law of the People’s Republic of China (promulgated
by Order No. 37 of the President of the People’s Republic of China, Apr. 12, 1986, effective
Jan. 1, 1987) (Lawinfochina) (China), available at http://www.law.yale.edu/rcw/rcw/juris
dictions/ase/china/PRC_Civ_Law_Gen_Prin.doc.
7 See Interpretation of the Supreme People’s Court on Several Issues About the Trial
of Cases Concerning the Right of Reputation (promulgated by Judicial Interpretation No. 26,
July 14, 1998, effective Sept. 15, 1998) (Lawinfochina) (China), available at
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But focusing on the words of the Chinese Constitution and of the General Civil
Code does not well facilitate an understanding of how the Chinese legal system
actually operates.9 In practice, “meet[ing] the needs of state security”10 results
in a whole lot of infringement of freedom and privacy, and censorship. Article
40, like much of the Chinese Constitution, is more aspirational than descriptive.
The disconnect between enumerated constitutional rights and the lived reality of
Chinese people is most powerfully illustrated by Article 35, which asserts that
Chinese citizens “enjoy freedom of speech, of the press, of assembly, of
association, of procession and of demonstration.”11 In practice these freedoms
are extremely circumscribed. Written laws and official practices unsubtly fetter
these freedoms substantially. So do unofficial government practices and
longstanding social norms. One Chinese literary scholar has noted that
“peepholes and eavesdropping are common devices in traditional Chinese
narrative.”12 Chinese citizens participate in a culture of peer observation and
orchestrated scrutiny.

A. China’s Government, Legal System, and Privacy Control
The official structure of the Chinese government was established by the
current (1982) Chinese Constitution.13 The National People’s Congress of the
People’s Republic of China is the highest organ of state power.14 Its permanent
body is the Politburo Standing Committee of the National People’s Congress.15
The National People’s Congress and its Standing Committee exercise the
legislative powers of the state, and also powers that in the United States are
http://www.lawinfochina.com/display.aspx?lib=law&id=6673 (discussing the Answers to
Some Problems on the Trial of Cases Concerning the Right of Reputation judicial
interpretation in 1993).
8 See, e.g., Stan Abrams, Beijing University Files Suit over Sex Scandal Allegations,
CHINA HEARSAY (Sept. 3, 2012), http://www.chinahearsay.com/beijing-university-files-suitover-sex-scandal-allegations/; Shaun Rein, In China, Reputation Rules, FORBES (Sept. 23,
2009,
2:56
PM),
http://www.forbes.com/2009/09/23/china-reputation-governmentleadership-managing-rein.html; Shanghai Court Hears Michael Jordan Suit, CHINA DAILY,
http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/business/2013-04/28/content_16458116.htm (last updated
Apr. 28, 2013).
9 See Donald C. Clarke, Empirical Research into the Chinese Judicial System, in
BEYOND COMMON KNOWLEDGE: EMPIRICAL APPROACHES TO THE RULE OF LAW 164, 181
(Erik G. Jensen & Thomas C. Heller eds., 2003).
10 XIANFA art. 40 (1982) (China).
11 Id. art. 35.
12 Cathy Silber, Privacy in Dream of the Red Chamber, in CHINESE CONCEPTS OF
PRIVACY, supra note 1, at 55, 56.
13 See The World Factbook: China, CENT. INTELLIGENCE AGENCY, https://www.cia.
gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/ch.html (last updated Aug. 22, 2013).
14 See Melanie Hart, China Selects Its 7 New Leaders, CENTER FOR AM. PROGRESS
(Nov. 16, 2012), http://www.americanprogress.org/issues/china/news/2012/11/16/45166/chi
na-selects-its-7-new-leaders/.
15 Id.
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prerogatives of our executive and judicial branches of government. The
Standing Committee is comprised of seven members, one of whom is
designated the Communist Party Chief.16 As of October 2013, that role is filled
by Xi Jinping, who replaced Hu Jintao, and who also succeeded Hu Jintao as
President of China in March of 2013.17 Like previous top Chinese government
executives, Xi Jinping is the public face of China and holds tremendous power.
The other high-profile Chinese leader in China, subordinate only to the Party
Chief/President, is the Premier of the State Council.18 This office is currently
held by the former Vice Premier Li Keqiang, who replaced Wen Jiabao in
March 2013.19 Though none of these four immensely powerful men ever stood
for popular election, their status and authority derive in part from their name
recognition and reputations among the Chinese citizenry. Just as American
politicians will sometimes assert that criticism of them is “bad for the country,”
Chinese leaders frame criticism of themselves as potentially destabilizing
attacks on the CPC. Unlike American politicians, Chinese leaders can actively
control what is said about them with imperfect, but still meaningful,
effectiveness.
Informally, the communicative restrictions under which Chinese people live
their lives are openly acknowledged by people within the CPC hierarchy, often
with the explanation that “China just has too many people” to make broader
expressive freedoms a realistic possibility. The mechanisms of control are many
and are deployed top down, bottom up and horizontally.20 Top down
communicative control is mandated by the central government, which sets
policy but delegates most of the mechanics of the actual control infrastructure to
the CPC-affiliated leadership of the provincial governments, with the oversight
of the national CPC hierarchy. Bottom up and horizontal control comes from
ordinary people looking to maintain or improve their economic and social status
by engaging in active surveillance of those around them, as part of their jobs, or
on a volunteer basis.
One of the most startling moments of the first class I taught in China came
when several students introduced themselves as my “course monitors.” These
were voluntary positions that brought them some small measure of recognition
and prestige within the University and possibly within the CPC. My course
monitors were always there to help me; willing to make photocopies; insure that
I always had tea, chalk and an eraser; distribute Powerpoint slides; and make
16 Id.
17 Id.
18 Id.
19 Id.
20 See

generally Max Fisher, Chinese Government Officials Are Constantly
Wiretapping and Spying on One Another, WASH. POST, Feb. 19, 2013, http://www.washing
tonpost.com/blogs/worldviews/wp/2013/02/19/chinese-government-officials-are-constantlywiretapping-and-spying-on-one-another/; Frank Langfitt, In China, Beware: A Camera May
Be Watching You, NPR (Jan. 29, 2013, 3:30 AM), http://www.npr.org/2013/01/29/170469
038/in-china-beware-a-camera-may-be-watching-you.
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sure I knew when the Chinese holidays were. They also recorded and took
copious notes of my lectures for reasons both related and unrelated to the final
examination. I also always had Chinese faculty members sitting in on my
classes, for which they received teaching credit. My Fulbright orientation taught
me to expect this because the CPC is very suspicious of foreigners, especially
those employed by the U.S. State Department as I was.21
Law schools are particularly sensitive about outside influences. The CPC
has far less sway over industry and commerce than it used to. Two places where
the Party still retains powerful control are China’s public universities and
China’s legal system. Chinese law schools sit at the intersection of both, so they
are institutions where Party loyalty is particularly emphatically fostered and
policed. At Tongji University Law School, students are required to take a
political indoctrination class to learn about the genius of Deng Xiaoping and his
“Reform and Opening” innovations, which led to the current economic system
of “Capitalism with Chinese Characteristics.” Atypically for courses at Tongji,
attendance was taken at every class meeting.
Chinese academics are also scrutinized. The English-language press has
reported that Chinese faculty members are counseled not to lecture about or
discuss “the seven unmentionables” in their classrooms; the forbidden topics
include universal values, freedom of the press, civil society, human rights, the
Communist Party’s historical errors, the rich elite, and judicial independence.22
And their lectures are monitored. According to a recent NPR report:
21 For a fascinating account of university teaching in China, see generally AMY

WERBEL, LESSONS FROM CHINA: AMERICA IN THE HEARTS AND MINDS OF THE WORLD’S
MOST IMPORTANT RISING GENERATION (2013).
22 Willy Lam, China’s Reform Hands Fail To Clap, ASIA TIMES ONLINE,
http://www.atimes.com/atimes/China/CHIN-02-240513.html (last visited Sept. 26, 2013)
(“Xi, who is also president and commander-in-chief, indicated soon after taking power at the
18th Chinese Communist Party (CCP) Congress last November that party authorities will do
whatever it takes to firm up the people’s ‘self-confidence in the road’ (daolu zixin) of
socialism with Chinese characteristics. There was no bigger threat to the CCP’s status as
China’s ‘perennial ruling party’ than a ‘calcium deficiency of the spirit’ among certain party
members. It is therefore not surprising that commissars in CCP units, including the
Propaganda Department, are pushing through draconian measures to prevent Chinese
intellectuals, especially college students, from going down what Xi called ‘the deviant path’
of Westernization. In an unpublished internal party document entitled ‘Concerning the
Situation in the Ideological Sphere,’ the CCP General Office called upon departments
handling education, ideology and the media to tackle ‘seven serious problems in the
ideological sphere that merit attention’. The circular added that these problems reflected ‘the
sharpness and complexity of struggle in the ideological sphere’. What these challenges are is
revealed by the fact that the document asked teaching staff in universities nationwide to steer
clear of ‘seven unmentionable topics’ (qige buyaojiang): universal values; press freedom;
the civil society; citizens’ rights; the party’s historical aberrations; the ‘privileged capitalistic
class’ (quangui zichan jieji); and independence of the judiciary.”); see also Barbara Demick,
China’s Xi More Maoist than Reformer Thus Far, L.A. TIMES, June 8, 2013,
http://articles.latimes.com/2013/jun/08/world/la-fg-china-xi-20130608/2; Xi Jinping and His
Take on the Seven Deadly Sins, STIRRING TROUBLE INTERNATIONALLY (May 30, 2013, 12:03

2013]

PRIVACY LAWS AND PRIVACY LEVERS

859

Last year, Beijing’s China University of Politics and Law installed
cameras in classrooms. Officials said it was to prevent cheating, but professors
didn’t believe them. Liu Xin, who teaches administrative law, thinks the school
plans to target teachers who might criticize China’s current system in front of
students. “Because things are recorded, once they suspect certain teachers are
problematic . . . they can find the recordings and that means they’ve found
evidence,” Liu says. She says cameras will intimidate instructors from
speaking their minds and undermine learning. Liu thinks professors will just
teach from textbooks to protect themselves.23

Citizens who feel that they have suffered privacy violations that were
inflicted by other citizens can appeal to the Chinese legal system. However,
there is little realistic probability of successful redress for privacy incursions
inflicted by government entities. Only if a particular government official was
found to have been acting illegally on a fairly significant scale would a citizen
alleging privacy violations have an opportunity to air these grievances publicly,
and the remedy would most likely be a public apology and possibly the censure
of any official the Party concluded had acted corruptly.24
The judicial system of the People’s Republic of China (PRC) is described in
Articles 123–35 of the Chinese Constitution.25 From the top level of the power
hierarchy down, the Chinese court system is comprised of the following: the
Supreme People’s Court, the Higher People’s Courts, the Intermediate People’s
Courts, and the Basic People’s Courts.26
Litigants are generally limited to one appeal, on the theory of finality of
judgment by two trials. Cases of second instances are often reviewed de novo
as to both law and facts. Requests for appellate review take the form of appeals
and protests (in criminal cases). Appeals are lodged by parties to the case,
defendants and private prosecutors.27

AM), http://www.stirringtroubleinternationally.com/2013/05/30/xi-jinping-and-the-sevenunmentionables-or-deadly-sins-to-avoid/ (“Comrade Xi has told the Party faithful that there
are seven unmentionables, seven ‘deadly sins’ that they should be very careful to avoid at all
cost. The seven are: universal values; freedom of the press; civil society; human rights; the
Party historical errors; the rich elite; and the independence of the judiciary. In case you are
confused, these ‘deadly sins’ are all non-communist values. So what Comrade Xi is getting
at really is that the greatest danger to communist rule is not a foreign intervention but the
insidious penetration of foreign ideas and values.”).
23 Langfitt, supra note 20.
24 This was learned by talking to attorneys in China.
25 XIANFA arts. 123–35 (1982) (China); see also A Brief Introduction to China,
LAWINFOCHINA.COM (May 31, 2010), http://www.lawinfochina.com/Legal/index.shtm.
26 A Brief Introduction to China, supra note 25.
27 Id.
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Chinese courts function more as dispute resolution mechanisms than like
Western style courts,28 and usually do not issue substantively explanatory
decisions, just rulings which state who wins, but not why.29 It is hard to obtain
dependable information about how much litigation concerning privacy issues
has occurred in China. There isn’t a comprehensive central repository of court
decisions, and even when rendered the decisions are not public documents and
usually are only released to the parties in the case.30 When court decisions are
lengthy, detailed and more widely released, it is usually in furtherance of a
specific political agenda.31 So called “guiding cases” are intended to influence
other judges’ interpretations of particular laws, but they tend to be few and far
between. In the active area of intellectual property law, which is comprised of
patent law, trademark law, copyright law and sometimes trade secret law,
usually only a proportionately small number of guiding cases are released each
year,32 and if the prevailing views of the CPC change on an issue, the guiding
cases can be withdrawn without notice or explanation. Even basic information
like the number of decided cases by subject area, or by geographic region, is not
readily available.33
Economist Paul Krugman recently said of China:
All economic data are best viewed as a peculiarly boring genre of science
fiction, but Chinese data are even more fictional than most. Add a secretive
government, a controlled press, and the sheer size of the country, and it’s
harder to figure out what’s really happening in China than it is in any other
major economy.34

Secrecy is also a hallmark of the Chinese judicial system. There is very
little transparency in the operation of the courts, and little to no judicial
28 RACHEL E. STERN, ENVIRONMENTAL LITIGATION IN CHINA: A STUDY IN POLITICAL
AMBIVALENCE 44 (2013).
29 See id. at 124.
30 Id. at 11.
31 Cf. id. at 131.
32 See Supreme People’s Court, Annual Report on Intellectual Property Cases (2012)
(Abstract), CHINA L. & PRAC., Jul/Aug 2013, at 31; Supreme People’s Court, Annual Report
on Intellectual Property Cases (2011) (Abstract), CHINA L. & PRAC., June 2012, at 14; see
also Judith Romero, China Guiding Cases Project Publishes Four New “Guiding Cases”
Released by China’s Supreme People’s Court, SLS NEWS (May 3, 2012),
http://blogs.law.stanford.edu/newsfeed/2012/05/03/china-guiding-cases-project-publishesfour-new-%E2%80%9Cguiding-cases%E2%80%9D-released-by-chinas-supreme-peoplescourt/; Steven Tung, As Chinese Courts Announce “Guiding Cases,” Stanford Law School
Helps To Spread the Word, STAN. NEWS (Feb. 6, 2012), http://news.stanford.edu/news/
2012/february/china-guiding-cases-020612.html; Laney Zhang, China: Supreme People’s
Court Releases New Guiding Cases, LIBR. CONGRESS, http://www.loc.gov/lawweb/serv
let/lloc_news?disp3_l205403371_text (last updated Oct. 17, 2012).
33 STERN, supra note 28, at 10–11.
34 Paul Krugman, Hitting China’s Wall, N.Y. TIMES, July 19, 2013, http://www.ny
times.com/2013/07/19/opinion/krugman-hitting-chinas-wall.html.
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independence. Verdicts are almost always issued without supporting written
opinions that are publically available, if they exist at all. As one observer
recounted:
It is important to note that, by design, China does not technically have an
independent judiciary or a legal system that operates outside the influence of
the ruling Chinese Communist Party. This is an important distinction between
China and Western democracies in which the court system is a critical
component of the checks and balances placed on the other branches of
government. In fact, China’s lack of an independent judicial system
exacerbates all the other fault lines running through the totalitarian state: there
simply is no effective recourse available to individuals whose interests are
harmed by the excesses of CCP officials, laws, and institutions. Think of the
scope and scale of what is addressed in the United States everyday through
civil and criminal litigation—redress from unfair laws and business practices,
compensation for injury, fraud, and lax environmental regulation, assignment
of liability, justice for victims of public and private malfeasance, marital and
custody disputes, protection of private physical and intellectual property. Some
would argue ours is an overly litigious society. However, the average
individual seeking a forum in which to officially air grievances and pursue
some form of justice in China has a difficult time.
Most importantly, [China’s legal] system lacks neutrality. The CCP
approves all court appointments, and judges are technically responsible to the
Party, not to the people. From the Basic, Intermediate, Higher Level People’s
Court, and Supreme People’s Court, the CCP hand is evident. The CCP’s
Political and Legal Committee has the power to intervene in deliberations, and
even to overturn verdicts issued. In addition, the infrastructure lacks capacity;
for example, there is one lawyer per 10,000 people in China (the United States
ratio is one lawyer per 550 people). And finally, in many Western
democracies, the ultimate arbiter of a law’s constitutionality is the court
system. In China, this function becomes muddled and the CCP apparatus often
rules on the interpretation of its own laws.35

While some scholars argue that the Chinese legal system is developing in
positive directions, others perceive what one describes as a turn against law that
de-emphasizes the role of formal law and court adjudication in “a top-down
authoritarian response motivated by social stability concerns.”36 Privacy
provided by the Chinese legal infrastructure against the CPC is nonexistent.
Like the United States, China lacks a comprehensive personal information law,
but unlike in the United States there are no effective checks on governmental
executive powers, or avenues of appeal to an independent judiciary,37 or any
35 Modern China: The Promise and Challenge of an Emerging Superpower, WORLD
SAVVY MONITOR, June 2008, at 55, 55–56, available at http://worldsavvy.org/monitor/index.
php?option=com_content&view=article&id=113&Itemid=176.
36 Carl F. Minzner, China’s Turn Against Law, 59 AM. J. COMP. L. 935, 936 (2011).
37 See generally DANIEL C.K. CHOW, THE LEGAL SYSTEM OF THE PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC
OF CHINA IN A NUTSHELL 198–218 (2d ed. 2009).
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ability to leverage investigative reporting in the national media. Given the
perception of China as a place bereft of private communications options, the
absence of a privacy legal regime is significant to foreign and domestic business
interests.38 The CPC understands this, and has been struggling to respond for
years in a way that reassures those involved in commerce without emboldening
those interested in political activism.

B. Consumers and Commercial Tracking
The Chinese Internet is by many accounts a giant shopping mall, much like
what Westerners experience when they go online.39 The Internet is used most
by China’s economic and educational elites;40 there is a strong geographical
correlation with Internet usage as well.41 As in any wealthy nation, business
entities in China like to collect information about online consumers.42
Privacy conflicts between private entities and private citizens are somewhat
less problematic to the CPC than privacy issues between individuals and the
CPC, at least in theory. The Chinese government has responded to concerns that
emerging business practices related to advertising and marketing threaten the
privacy of individuals43 by issuing a startlingly large number of similar
guidelines and regulations, and also proposing a few new laws.
A draft Personal Information Protection Law was published in late 2006,
but never enacted.44 Article 2 of the Tort Law of the People’s Republic of
China put into effect in 2012 references privacy generally, stating:
Those who infringe upon civil rights and interests shall be subject to the tort
liability according to this Law. “Civil rights and interests” used in this Law
38 Cf. Freaking Out: Is Private Enterprise Under Attack?, ECONOMIST (Sept. 14, 2013),

http://www.economist.com/news/china/21586293-private-enterprise-under-attack-freakingout (discussing China’s recent crackdown on corruption in businesses, despite official
statements that China will press for more business-friendly reforms).
39 Gang Lu, [Infographic] China’s Internet Is a Giant Shopping Mall, TECHNODE (Feb.
28, 2013), http://technode.com/2013/02/28/infographic-chinas-internet-is-a-giant-shoppingmall/.
40 See David Wertime, Translation: Why China Has Two Internets, Not One, and What
To Do About It, TEA LEAF NATION (Aug. 3, 2012), http://www.tealeafnation.com/2012/08/
translation-why-china-has-two-internets-not-one-and-what-to-do-about-it/.
41 See Eli Bildner, A Map of Two Chinas—Internet Penetration and Economic
Development, TEA LEAF NATION (Jan. 22, 2013), http://www.tealeafnation.com/2013/01/amap-of-two-chinas-internet-penetration-and-economic-development/.
42 See Wang Yijun, Who Steals My Personal Information?, PEOPLE’S DAILY ONLINE
(Mar. 30, 2012, 3:04 PM), http://english.people.com.cn/90882/7774703.html.
43 See HAO WANG, PROTECTING PRIVACY IN CHINA: A RESEARCH ON CHINA’S PRIVACY
STANDARDS AND THE POSSIBILITY OF ESTABLISHING THE RIGHT TO PRIVACY AND THE
INFORMATION PRIVACY PROTECTION LEGISLATION IN MODERN CHINA 23–24 (2011).
44 Gastón Fernández, China Publishes Draft Privacy Guidelines, HOGAN LOVELLS
CHRON. DATA PROTECTION (Apr. 14, 2011), http://www.hldataprotection.com/2011/04/arti
cles/international-eu-privacy/china-publishes-draft-privacy-guidelines/.
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shall include the right to life, the right to health, the right to name, the right to
reputation, the right to honor, right to self image, right of privacy, marital
autonomy, guardianship, ownership, usufruct, security interest, copyright,
patent right, exclusive right to use a trademark, right to discovery, equities,
right of succession, and other personal and property rights and interests.45

In January of 2011, draft guidelines entitled “Information Security
Technology—Guidelines for Personal Information Protection” were issued
jointly by the General Administration of Quality Supervision Inspection and
Quarantine, and the Standardization Administration, after being developed in
consultation with the Ministry of Industry and Information Technology, the
PRC agency that regulates telecommunications.46 An amended version of the
Guidelines was put into effect in 2013.47 The Guidelines only apply to
computer networks.48 The Guidelines require that personal information be
processed only for specific and reasonable purposes and that owners be notified
of the purpose and scope of use before their personal information is processed.49
Entities are required to ensure that the personal information collected is accurate
and is adequately protected to prevent unauthorized access, release, destruction
or alteration.50 The Guidelines prohibit illegal, disguised or indirect collection
of personal information.51
The Guidelines further prohibit collecting personal information from
juveniles below the age of sixteen52 or collecting any personal information
irrelevant to the defined purposes, especially with respect to race, religion,
genetic background, fingerprints, health status or sexual activities.53 Owners
have the right to request that managers keep their personal information
confidential, and to disclose how the information was obtained, processed or
disclosed. Owners also have the right to demand that any false information be
corrected.54

45 Tort Law of the People’s Republic of China, PROCEDURALLAW.CN (Jan. 10, 2010),

http://www.procedurallaw.cn/english/law/201001/t20100110_300173.html (last visited Oct.
21, 2013) (providing an English translation).
46 Graham Greenleaf & George Yijun Tian, China Expands Data Protection Through
2013 Guidelines: A “Third Line” for Personal Information Protection, with a Translation of
the Guidelines, 122 PRIVACY L. & BUS. INT’L REP. 1, 1, 4 (2013).
47 Id. at 2.
48 Id. at 7.
49 Id. at 14.
50 Id. at 5.
51 Id. at 4–5.
52 Greenleaf & Tian, supra note 46, at 16.
53 See id. at 9.
54 See id. at 3–5. See generally Hunton & Williams LLP, China: Draft of Personal
Information Protection Guidelines Issued for Comment, PRIVACY & INFO. SECURITY L. BLOG
(Feb. 2011), http://www.huntonprivacyblog.com/uploads/file/china_draft_of_personal_info_
protection_guidelines_issued_for_comment.pdf.
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On December 28, 2012, the Standing Committee of the National People’s
Congress passed the Resolution of the Standing Committee of the NPC Relating
to Strengthening the Protection of Information on the Internet.55 These
Regulations proclaim that “the State will protect electronic information that can
identify individuals and implicate their private affairs, and [that] no
organization or individual may misappropriate or otherwise obtain electronic
personal information by unlawful means, or sell or otherwise unlawfully
provide it to other persons.”56 The Regulations set forth requirements directed
at Internet Service Providers (ISPs) and other businesses that handle electronic
personal information:57
ISPs, public service units (PSUs) and other companies that intend to
collect and use personal digital information:
• Must make their policies for collection and use public
• Must explicitly state the purposes, means, and scope of the collection
• Must obtain the consent of the all [sic] of the subjects of the data
collection
• Must not violate relevant laws and regulations
• Must not violate any agreements or contracts with the subjects of the
data collection.58

The scope of the Regulations is limited to electronic personal information
and, for the most part, only Internet-related processing.59 Still, it seems to
suggest CPC recognition that people care about online privacy and want the
government to regulate how private entities interact with them and their
personal data. How these Regulations will be enforced is an open question, but
their passage signals that the CPC believes the issue is important to the Chinese
citizenry, and something that the Chinese people expect their government to
concern itself with.
In April 2013, the People’s Republic of China’s General Office of the
National People’s Congress published a draft amendment to the Law on the
Protection of Consumer Rights and Interests (enacted in 1994) and solicited
public comments on the amendment.60 The existing Law on the Protection of
55 Hunton & Williams LLP, Chinese Legislature Passes Data Privacy Resolution,

PRIVACY & INFO. SECURITY L. BLOG (Jan. 2, 2013) [hereinafter Data Privacy Resolution],
http://www.huntonprivacyblog.com/2013/01/articles/chinese-legislature-passes-data-priva
cy-resolution/.
56 Id.
57 Id.
58 Samon Sun & Jared Nelson, China: Decision on Strengthening the Protection of
Online Information, NAT’L L. REV. (Jan. 7, 2013), http://www.natlawreview.com/article
/china-decision-strengthening-protection-online-information.
59 Data Privacy Resolution, supra note 55.
60 See Amendments Viewed for Consumer Rights, SHANGHAI DAILY, Apr. 24, 2013,
http://www.shanghaidaily.com/national/Amendments-viewed-for-consumer-rights/shdaily.
shtml.
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Consumer Rights and Interests, which has been in effect for about twenty years,
does not contain provisions that protect the personal information of
consumers.61 The proposed amendment would address this omission, affirming
that consumers are entitled to the rights of name, image and privacy, and that
business owners should obtain consumers’ consent and explicitly explain the
purpose, form and scope of information use before collecting and using
consumers’ personal information, and imposing an obligation on business
owners to adopt necessary technical measures to ensure security.62 The
proposed amendment extends existing rules applicable to the Internet
information services sector to the broader realm of consumer protection, and
mirrors provisions which have been in effect at the provincial level under
provincial consumer protection regulations.63
Thus, there has been a significant legislative response to concerns about
online privacy. But it is not clear that anything truly meaningful transpired. One
scholar of the Chinese legal system recently observed:
Frankly speaking, in the past decades, there are more and more new laws, new
ordinances, new judicial interpretations, which, many of Chinese citizens
think, are really no need to make such rules, and too often these rules confused,
not only us—the common citizens, but also confused lots of judges, that is not
a good scenario.64

What is not known about these overlapping privacy guidelines, regulations
and laws is how often they are invoked, and whether they are ever effectively
enforced. In 2007 it was widely reported that a Chinese college student in
Beijing sued Microsoft for violating his privacy with antipiracy software.65 I
was not able to learn the outcome of this case, however, or find others like it in
English language media generally or via the English language version of China
Law Digest, which reports only a total of two cases involving privacy issues,
one a right of privacy for Hepatitis B carriers and the other basically a notice
that the “Ministry Of Civil Affairs Emphasizes Respect for Personal Privacy in
Marriage.”

III. PRIVACY AND POLITICAL AMBIVALENCE
In her brilliant book Environmental Litigation in China, Rachel E. Stern
writes about the political ambivalence endemic to China in the context of
61 Id.
62 Id.
63 See id.
64 Liubao Wu, Rebuilding Public Trust and Confidence in Chinese Courts 5 (Jan. 10,

2013) (unpublished manuscript), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?ab
stract_id=2283189&download=.
65 Gregg Keizer, Chinese Student Sues Microsoft for Privacy Violation, PCWORLD
(Sept. 18, 2007, 12:00 PM), http://www.pcworld.com/article/137315/article.html.
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environmental law and litigation.66 She notes that there are many different
bureaucracies at the provincial and national levels, and they can send
conflicting signals about important policy issues.67 Additionally, CPC
representatives vet judicial appointments and sometimes intervene in individual
court decisions in ways that do not always appear consistent. All of these
factors work against the formation of a coherent approach to environmental law
in China.68
The same sort of ambivalence seems to infuse the CPC approach to privacy
and the law. Governmental officials charged with economic development are
likely to have a very different view of the desirability of a privacy infrastructure
than those involved with maintaining social stability. This sort of fragmented,
internal-conflict-driven approach to privacy is not unique to the Chinese
government of course. But China’s political and legal systems can render the
specific dimensions of the issue uncommonly invisible. There may not be any
public record whatsoever of efforts taken by citizens to enforce their statutory
privacy rights. As one reporter noted, “China’s legal system often hands down
verdicts that the powerless consider unfair. But a bigger problem is that courts
often refuse to issue any verdict at all—or even acknowledge that some
bothersome legal complaints exist.”69 In this way the answer to thorny
questions about politically difficult privacy issues is neither yes nor no.70

A. Little Anonymity for Anyone Online or Off
China is divided into twenty-two provinces71 (twenty-three if one includes
Taiwan, as the CPC prefers to do), four independent municipalities (Beijing,
66 See generally STERN, supra note 28.
67 See id. at 99.
68 Id. at 6–8; Nicholas Calcina Howson, “Quack Corporate Governance” as

Traditional Chinese Medicine—the Securities Regulation Cannibalization of China’s
Corporate Law and a State Regulator’s Battle Against State Political Economic Power,
SEATTLE U. L. REV. (forthcoming) (Mich. Law Sch. Pub. Law & Legal Theory Research
Paper Series, Paper No. 331, 2013) (Law & Econ. Research Paper Series, Paper No. 13-009,
2013) (manuscript at 3), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=
2279264&download=yes (“Fifth and finally, I believe that this writing reveals a highly
complex, and horizontally-oriented, identity of what political scientists have called the PRC
party state’s ‘fragmented authoritarianism’—or how vertically arranged silo-systems of
power in what is understood as a unitary party state are permitted to compete and constrain
horizontally-situated, short-term focused, political economic power in the service of longterm economic system and development policy goals.”).
69 Joseph Kahn, When Chinese Sue the State, Cases Are Often Smothered, N.Y. TIMES,
Dec. 28, 2005, http://www.nytimes.com/2005/12/28/international/asia/28land.html?ex=117
2466000&en=1c4306de9a1f7a30&ei=5070.
70 See id.
71 Amanda Briney, China’s 23 Provinces: A List of China’s 23 Provincial Divisions,
ABOUT.COM, http://geography.about.com/od/chinamaps/a/chinaprovinces.htm (last updated
June 14, 2010) (stating the area and capital of each province as follows: 1) Qinghai. Area:
278,457 square miles (721,200 sq. km.); Capital: Xining. 2) Sichuan. Area: 187,260 square
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Shanghai, Tianjin and Chongqing), five autonomous regions (Inner Mongolia,
Xinjiang, Guangxi, Ningxia and Tibet), and two special administrative regions
(Hong Kong and Macau). Each of these political subdivisions has a central
government, and a court system. Chinese citizens are issued identity cards,
which they are required—or at least well advised—to keep with them at all
times.72 The identity cards contain the name, sex, nationality, date of birth,
address of permanent residence of the bearer, the citizen’s identity number, the
bearer’s photograph, term of validity of the card and the issuing authority, and
serve the “purposes of proving the identities of the citizens residing within the
territory of the People’s Republic of China, safeguarding their legitimate rights
and interests, facilitating their social activities and maintaining public order.”73
Under the Hukou system, Chinese citizens are expected—and sometimes
required—to remain in the province or other subdivision in which they were
born.74 They need permission to live and work elsewhere in China, and may be
denied social benefits even if they relocate legally.75 National identity cards are
miles (485,000 sq. km.); Capital: Chengdu. 3) Gansu. Area: 175,406 square miles (454,300
sq. km.); Capital: Lanzhou. 4) Heilongjiang. Area: 175,290 square miles (454,000 sq. km.);
Capital: Harbin. 5) Yunnan. Area: 154,124 square miles (394,000 sq. km.); Capital:
Kunming. 6) Hunan. Area: 81,081 square miles (210,000 sq. km.); Capital: Changsha. 7)
Shaanxi. Area: 79,382 square miles (205,600 sq. km.); Capital: Xi’an. 8) Hebei. Area:
72,471 square miles (187,700 sq. km.); Capital: Shijiazhuang. 9) Jilin. Area: 72,355 square
miles (187,400 sq. km.); Capital: Changchun. 10) Hubei. Area: 71,776 square miles
(185,900 sq. km.); Capital: Wuhan. 11) Guangdong. Area: 69,498 square miles (180,000 sq.
km.); Capital: Guangzhou. 12) Guizhou. Area: 67,953 square miles (176,000 sq. km.);
Capital: Guiyang. 13) Jiangxi. Area: 64,479 square miles (167,000 sq. km.); Capital:
Nanchang. 14) Henan. Area: 64,479 square miles (167,000 sq. km.); Capital: Zhengzhou.
15) Shanxi. Area: 60,347 square miles (156,300 sq. km.); Capital: Taiyuan. 16) Shandong.
Area: 59,382 square miles (153,800 sq. km.); Capital: Jinan. 17) Liaoning. Area: 56,332
square miles (145,900 sq. km.); Capital: Shenyang. 18) Anhui. Area: 53,938 square miles
(139,700 sq. km.); Capital: Hefei. 19) Fujian. Area: 46,834 square miles (121,300 sq. km.);
Capital: Fuzhou. 20) Jiangsu. Area: 39,614 square miles (102,600 sq. km.); Capital: Nanjing.
21) Zhejiang. Area: 39,382 square miles (102,000 sq. km.); Capital: Nanjing. 22) Taiwan.
Area: 13,738 square miles (35,581 sq. km.); Capital: Taipei. 23) Hainan. Area: 13,127
square miles (34,000 sq. km.); Capital: Haikou); Sara Naumann, List of China’s Provinces:
Understand the Chinese Provinces, ABOUT.COM, http://gochina.about.com/od/cityareaguides
inchina/tp/Chinese_Provinces.htm (last visited Oct. 2, 2013). By some accounts, China
counts Taiwan as its 23rd province. See, e.g., The World Factbook: China, supra note 13.
72 See Law of the People’s Republic of China on Resident Identity Cards (promulgated
by the Standing Comm. Nat’l People’s Cong., June 28, 2003, effective Jan. 1, 2004) (China),
available at http://english.gov.cn/laws/2005-09/06/content_29700.htm.
73 Id.
74 See Aaron Back, China To Speed Up Reform of “Hukou” System, WALL ST. J., Dec.
18, 2012, http://online.wsj.com/article/SB100014241278873244075045781867042848969
48.html; see also Kam Wing Chan & Will Buckingham, Is China Abolishing the Hukou
System?, 2008 CHINA Q. 582, 582–84.
75 See Chan & Buckingham, supra note 74, at 583; Back, supra note 74; Evan Osnos,
Abortion and Politics in China, NEW YORKER (June 15, 2012), http://www.newyorker.com/
online/blogs/evanosnos/2012/06/abortion-and-politics-in-china.html (“What’s more, the
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one mechanism used by Chinese governmental entities to keep track of where
people are residing, and with whom they are sharing a home. They are also used
to track citizens’ domestic travels. An identity card must be proffered to
purchase a plane or train ticket, or to check into a hotel.
Chinese citizens are also monitored and tracked online. While this is true
for most and possibly all citizens of every country, the monitoring is more
transparent in the sense that everyone knows it is happening very extensively. In
China all non-commercial websites, including blogs, must be registered, and the
sites’ developers or owners must provide their identities.76 Similar identity
registration regulations apply to individuals who engage in microblogging,
using platforms such as Weibo, a Chinese equivalent of Twitter, and QQ, a
Facebook-like social media platform.77 This does not seem to dampen
enthusiasm for the Internet in China, which may be the largest and fastestgrowing market for blog and other social media services in the world:
According to an official report released by the China Internet Network
Information Center, as of the end of June 2012, the number of blogs in China
had reached more than 353 million and about 65.7% of Chinese Internet users
had their own blogs. In recent years, a vast number of Chinese Internet users
have also shown strong interest in maintaining their own microblog, or weibo,
which is the Chinese version of Twitter. More than 273 million microblogs
have been launched in China, which means that about 50.9% of China’s
Internet users have been involved in microblogging activities.78

One of the reasons interest in blogging and microblogging has not been
discouraged by the instantiation of the real-name policy is the possibility that
the policy isn’t actually enforced very broadly.79 The enforcement burden is a
heavy yoke on telecommunications companies that has complicated internecine
connections with the CPC. The CPC may be allowing a long phase in, or it may
be too divided to act decisively to compel compliance.
family was being penalized because of the widely resented ‘household registration’ system,
which acts [as] a kind of domestic passport to limit migration. Feng and her husband
reportedly thought they were entitled to a second child because many of their friends were
(some rural areas are less strict), but it turned out that Feng’s registration, or hukou, was still
tied to her former address in another province, so she didn’t get the same exemptions to the
one-child policy. The house-registration system has been widely criticized for creating
something like an apartheid structure, which prevents people from gaining equal access to
schools, social services, and jobs.”).
76 Jyh-An Lee, Regulating Blogging and Microblogging in China, 91 OR. L. REV. 609,
612 (2012).
77 See generally Rachel Lu, What Happens to Free Speech on Weibo After Real Name
Registration?, TEA LEAF NATION (Feb. 28, 2012), http://www.tealeafnation.com/2012/02/
what-happens-to-free-speech-on-weibo-after-real-name-registration/.
78 Lee, supra note 76, at 609–10 (footnotes omitted).
79 See David Caragliano, Why China’s “Real Name” Internet Policy Doesn’t Work,
ATLANTIC (Mar. 26, 2013, 10:57 AM), http://www.theatlantic.com/china/archive/13/03/whychinas-real-name-internet-policy-doesnt-work/274373/.

2013]

PRIVACY LAWS AND PRIVACY LEVERS

869

The most salient feature of the CPC’s relationship with the wired world is
that Chinese leaders do not consider the Internet an unstoppable force for
openness and democracy; rather, they view the Web as something that is
fundamentally controllable if adequate attention and resources are deployed
toward this end. When seemingly omnipresent governmental monitoring
discerns objectionable communications, communications can be deleted
expeditiously, and the posters held legally responsible.
In addition, the Internet service and content providers that permit
unacceptable-to-authority communications to be distributed online can also be
held accountable. This means that media companies must stay closely in
communication with the CPC. As one observer wrote of a high profile unnamed
Chinese telecom executive: “In the past, W naively believed that he could use
technology to change society. Now he knows that even if you don’t involve
yourself in politics, politics will find a way to get involved with you.”80 Chinese
telecommunications companies engage in significant acts of censorship of their
networks before the governmental authorities take their turns, to curry favor and
to try to avoid trouble.81
Mechanisms of electronic communications control are deployed by the CPC
for two distinct but related categories of reasons: preventing anything that might
cause social unrest, especially community organizing, and preserving the
personal and professional reputations of CPC leaders. As one journalist
observed, China’s criteria for censoring the Internet involve applying to the
online environment “the rules that have prevailed since the Tiananmen Square
crackdown of 1989: do not jeopardise social stability, do not organise and do
not threaten the party.”82

B. Communitarian Concerns
China is a large and diverse country with a long history of armed
insurrections and a comparatively short history of national unity and relative
social and economic stability. Retaining a healthy level of social constancy is
doubtlessly a complicated and difficult endeavor, and I don’t in any way purport
to have a good sense of how much democracy is politically possible for China
in the short term. But even peaceful public dialogue is treated as a threat to the
government when the number of people engaging in the same conversation
reaches a number high enough to make the CPC uneasy. This is one explanation
for the persecution of Falun Gong adherents by the CPC, even though Falun
Gong teachings have never advocated violence or revolution. Falun Gong got

80 Wertime, supra note 40.
81 See E.H., How Does China Censor the Internet?, ECONOMIST (Apr. 21, 2013, 11:50

PM),
http://www.economist.com/blogs/economist-explains/2013/04/economist-explainshow-china-censors-internet?fsrc=scn%2Ftw_ec%2Fhow_does_china_censor_the_internet.
82 Id.
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organized, and there were simply too many people joining up and members
were too enthusiastic for CPC comfort.83
The Chinese government, at every level, has emphatically embraced the
power of the Internet in some respects, and uses blogs and other web sites as
tools to shape public opinion.84 It has long experience in media manipulation.
Whenever I watch the English language broadcast of CCTV News when I am in
the country, it seems as though only wonderful things are happening in China,
but consistently horrible events are occurring abroad: political upheavals,
natural disasters, and numerous crimes. The only positive thing I ever recall
seeing broadcast on CCTV about the United States was the time President
Obama was videoed catching and killing a fly during an interview in 2009. For
some reason that event got significant television coverage in China, and many
Chinese people I spoke to in the summer of 2013 still remembered it.
The CPC presence online is engaged with surreptitiously manipulative tools
such as astroturfing and search engine optimization.85 According to one scholar,
“It is reported that an army of government-trained online commentators writes
blogs in support of the Chinese state and its various stances.”86 Notable China
scholar Rebecca MacKinnon has reported:
The [Chinese] government increasingly combines censorship and
surveillance measures with pro-active efforts to steer online conversations in
the direction it prefers. In 2008 the Hong Kong-based researcher David
Bandurski determined that at least 280,000 people had been hired at various
levels of government to work as “online commentators.” Known derisively as
the “fifty cent party,” these people are paid to write postings that show their
employers in a favorable light in online chat rooms, social networking services,
blogs, and comments sections of news websites. Many more people do similar
work as volunteers—recruited from among the ranks of retired officials as well
as college students in the Communist Youth League who aspire to become
Party members.87

That being said, the CPC will often circulate reports about government
failures and even government corruption—just not all of them, and generally
from a very circumspect and verifiable fact-deficient perspective. To me it
83 See generally LAO CHENG-WU, THE REFUTATION AND ANALYSIS OF FALUN GONG

(2012).

84 See Jesper Schlaeger & Min Jiang, Battering Ram, Virus, or Politics as Usual? A

Case Study of Chinese Local Government Microblogging 5 (July 1, 2013) (unpublished
manuscript), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2258565.
85 See Nate Anderson, 280,000 Pro-China Astroturfers Are Running Amok Online, ARS
TECHNICA (Mar. 26, 2010, 11:10 AM), http://arstechnica.com/tech-policy/2010/03/280000pro-china-astroturfers-are-running-amok-online/.
86 Lee, supra note 76, at 612.
87 Rebecca MacKinnon, Visiting Fellow, Ctr. for Info. Tech. Policy, Princeton Univ.,
Testimony Before the Congressional–Executive Commission on China 8 (Mar. 1, 2010)
(footnote omitted).
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looks very much like some people within the CPC want to do the right thing by
Chinese citizens some of the time, but are restrained by a fear of undermining
Party authority or angering the wrong person.
Collective criticisms are of less concern to the government than one might
expect; it is unauthorized collective organizing that is most feared. References
to Taiwan, Tibet and the spring 1989 incident known as the Tiananmen Square
Massacre are by some accounts censored primarily to reduce the risk that they
will be used as foundational organizing tools for protests and rebellion. I was
surprised by how open some Chinese people were to discussing these matters
with me. Many had family members in Taiwan they talked about, or expressed a
desire to visit Tibet. Because the so-called Tiananmen Uprising was actually
dispersed geographically, and included protests in large cities such as Shanghai,
Chengdu and Guangzhou,88 people well outside of Beijing had participated in,
observed, or otherwise been affected by that event and were open to talking
about it in limited ways. With a few exceptions, the only time the topic came up
in my presence was when somebody else raised it. But once it was raised, I
asked questions and heard a number of opinions in response. A couple of people
even showed me photographs of students petitioning their government during
the optimistic first few days of the democracy protests. What I heard in China
from Chinese people was consistent with what I’d read89 and also heard from
Chinese immigrants who relocated to the United States in 1989 after
participating in the movement, to avoid being jailed for their activities. As
China expert Jeffrey Wasserstrom noted:
Other writers misleading[ly] present the taboo regarding discussion of the June
4th Massacre in a manner that suggests a Big Brother state is tightly
monitoring even the most private conversations, when the reality is that many
people in China now feel free (and indeed are free), as they weren’t always
before, to talk among themselves about even hot-button topics, such as the
crackdown in 1989, that would likely get them into trouble if they published
about them or held meetings to discuss them.90

That the CPC tolerates generalized criticism is illustrated by its relationship
to Mo Yan, the Chinese author who received the 2012 Nobel Prize for
88 Claudia Rosett, Remembering Tiananmen Square, FORBES (May 28, 2009, 12:00

AM),
http://www.forbes.com/2009/05/27/tiananmen-square-anniversary-mao-opinionscolumnists-china.html (“the movement . . . brought millions into the streets, not only in
Beijing, but in other major cities like Shanghai, Chengdu, Guangzhou”).
89 E.g., JEFFREY N. WASSERSTROM, CHINA IN THE 21ST CENTURY: WHAT EVERYONE
NEEDS TO KNOW 72–75 (2010).
90 Jeffrey Wasserstrom, Illuminating and Misleading Takes on China 20 Years Since
Tiananmen, HUFFINGTON POST (June 4, 2009), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/jeffreywasserstrom/illuminating-and-misleadi_b_211610.html; cf. Christopher Beam, What Does
the Chinese Government Say Happened at Tiananmen Square?, SLATE MAG. (June 3, 2009,
7:10 PM), http://www.slate.com/articles/news_and_politics/explainer/2009/06/tussle_in_tian
anmen_square.html.
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Literature.91 “Bull,” a short story by Mr. Yan that was translated into English
and published in the November 26, 2012 issue of the New Yorker, features
corruption and the distribution of unhealthy foods right from the opening
paragraph, which reads as follows:
It was Lao Lan who invented the scientific method of forcing pressurized
water into the pulmonary arteries of slaughtered animals. With this method,
you could empty a bucketful of water into a two-hundred-jin pig, while with
the old method you could barely empty half a bucket of water into the carcass
of a dead cow. The amount of money that the clever townspeople have spent
on water from our village when they thought they were paying for meat in the
years since will never be known, but I’m sure it would be a shockingly high
figure.92

The Lao Lan character is later described as a rich official who injected
formaldehyde into the meat he sold so that it would not spoil, a bully, and a
coward. Novels written by Mr. Mo “have touched on many of contemporary
China’s most sensitive themes, including the Cultural Revolution and the
country’s strict family-planning policies,” and “have been judged subversive
because of their sharp criticism of contemporary Chinese society.”93 And his
books were published with the authority and permission of the CPC. Mo Yan is
not just tolerated by the Chinese government, but actually employed by it. He
serves as vice chairman of the State-run Chinese Writers’ Association.94
Additionally, the CPC indirectly polices and criticizes itself. Newspapers
are owned and controlled by the Party, and the government employs the
journalists who fill their pages. In consequence, some topics are never covered
and others are addressed in skewed or blatantly dishonest ways. Nevertheless,
some of China’s social problems are identified and discussed, and governmental
actions are criticized in official publications. My journalist and journalism
professor friend and fellow 2011–2012 China Fulbrighter, Jill Hamburg
Coplan,95 has passionately explained that many journalists in China want to do
the right thing and keep pushing for a freer press. Incidents that are too big to
91 Andrew Jacobs & Sarah Lyall, After Fury over 2010 Peace Prize, China Embraces
Nobel Selection, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 11, 2012, http://www.nytimes.com/2012/10/12/books/
nobel-literature-prize.html?pagewanted=all.
92 Mo Yan, Bull, NEW YORKER, Nov. 26, 2012, http://www.newyorker.com/fiction/fea
tures/2012/11/26/121126fi_fiction_mo#ixzz2DMlWi0SI.
93 Jacobs & Lyall, supra note 91.
94 Id. (“Mr. Mo, 57, is hardly a tool of the Communist Party; much of his work is laced
with social criticism, and he is admired by readers of Chinese literature abroad as much as
he is hugely popular in his own country. But he does not consider himself political, and his
decision not to take a stand against the government—as well as his position as vice chairman
of the state-run Chinese Writers’ Association—has drawn criticism from Chinese dissident
writers.”).
95 See generally Jill Hamburg Coplan, COPLANS IN CHINA: A FULBRIGHT YEAR IN
BEIJING, AND BEYOND, http://coplansinchina.com/ (last updated Sept. 29, 2013).
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hide are now covered with surprising thoroughness. This was not readily
observable as recently as 2008 in the aftermath of the massive Sichuan
earthquake, when the New York Times accused the Chinese government of a
campaign to silence the surviving victims and the media, resorting to
harassment by police and threats of imprisonment.96 But now social media
platforms, though ostensibly under CPC control, are forcing the CPC to
communicate more actively and perhaps more openly.
When a high speed rail crash that killed forty people and injured 172
occurred in 2011, the power of Weibo (a Chinese homologue to Twitter) was
unequivocally displayed, as thirty million messages about the collision were
posted too quickly to be effectively censored.97 Mainstream CPC censors who
controlled Chinese news outlets may have felt pressured by this online
outpouring to offer more extensive coverage of the tragic event than they
otherwise might have. The magnitude of the online public dialogue also may
have motivated the government to act more dramatically than it would have
with less public interest or scrutiny. The CPC-administered Chinese media has
reported that CPC authorities are punishing fifty-four people deemed
responsible for the technical problems that led to the collision, and actually
named at least three of them publicly: Liu Zhijun, the country’s former railway
minister, Zhang Shuguang, the railway ministry’s former deputy chief engineer,
and Ma Cheng, former chairman of board at China Railway Signal and
Communication Corporation (CRSC), producer of the railway signaling system
which failed.98 Liu Zhijun was charged with bribery and abuse of power, which
are potentially death penalty offenses in China.99
The authorized press sometimes also covers fairly extreme failings by the
Chinese criminal justice system. For example, in 2005 the CPC-managed China
Daily News reported that: “A Chinese woman believed to have been killed in
the 1980s reappeared 16 years after the alleged killer was executed.”100 The
article raises a stunning number of issues in very few words, including human
trafficking, the incorrect identification of a corpse, potential perjury, fear of the
96 See Sichuan Earthquake, N.Y. TIMES, May 6, 2009, http://topics.nytimes.com/top/

news/science/topics/earthquakes/Sichuan_province_china/index.html.
97 C. Custer, The Wenzhou Crash and the Future of Weibo, TECH ASIA (Aug. 1, 2011,
5:00 PM), http://www.techinasia.com/the-wenzhou-crash-and-the-future-of-weibo/; Kenneth
Rapoza, In China Train Crash, Sina’s Weibo Breaks News, FORBES (Aug. 1, 2011),
http://www.forbes.com/sites/kenrapoza/2011/08/01/in-china-train-crash-sinas-weibo-breaksnews/; see also Zhan Zhang, Rock the Journalism–the Function of Weibo in Foreign
Media’s News Practice in China (Apr. 29, 2013) (unpublished manuscript), available at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2258101&download=yes.
98 54 Punished over Train Crash, CHINA DAILY, Dec. 28, 2011, http://europe.china
daily.com.cn/china/2011-12/28/content_14346197.htm.
99 Cao Yin & An Baijie, Former Railways Minister Charged with Bribery, CHINA
DAILY, Apr. 11, 2013, http://europe.chinadaily.com.cn/china/2013-04/11/content_1639159
4.htm.
100 “Victim” Reappears After “Murderer” Executed, CHINA DAILY, June 17, 2005,
http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/english/doc/2005-06/17/content_452336.htm.
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legal system, and the possibility that torture had been used to obtain a coerced
confession, stating in pertinent part:
Shi Xiaorong was declared a “murder victim” by local police in April
1987 in Mayang county in Central China’s Hunan Province after a
dismembered body was found in a Mayang river.
Shi said she was actually swindled and sold to Shandong Province as
somebody’s wife in March that year.
Teng Xingshan, a butcher, was convicted of the murder as the local police
said the dismemberment technique was “very professional.” He was executed
in 1989 despite pleas of innocence.
According to police investigation material, Teng was believed to have
sexual relations with Shi and killed her on suspicions of her stealing his
money.
But Shi, who is now in a Guizhou jail for drug trafficking, said she did not
know Teng, urging the authorities to rectify the case.
Shi returned to her hometown in Guizhou Province in 1993 and Teng’s
relatives [were] told she was still alive one year later. But it took years for
them to verify the information and they did not have the funds and the courage
to take the case to court until Teng’s daughter and son lodged a lawsuit at the
Hunan Higher People’s court last month.
The 1989 verdict of the court reads that: “Teng confessed his crimes and
his confession conformed with scientific inspections and identifications.”
Whether torture was used in trial is still unknown.101

As if all that wasn’t shocking enough, the article concludes by noting
another wrongful murder conviction that had been recently reported, which also
included allegations of a confession obtained by torture:
The case came two months after the She Xianglin case in Hubei Province.
She Xianglin served 11 years in prison for “murdering” his wife in 1994 who
reappeared in 2005.
She was later declared innocent and released from the prison.
Former security guard She claimed he was deprived of sleep during 10
days of interrogation until he signed documents pleading guilty to murder. He
is now suing the government for compensation over his mistrial and torture
during interrogation.102

There are, however, many important details missing in these accounts, such
as the names of anyone working for the government who was involved in the
arrest, conviction and execution of Teng Xingshan or the arrest, conviction and
imprisonment of She Xianglin. The names of the police officers are not
provided, nor the names of the judges involved, nor even the names of any
witnesses. Some people involved have clearly had their personal privacy
101 Id.
102 Id.; see also “Murder Victim” Reappears After “Killer” Executed, CHINA.ORG.CN

(June 17, 2005), http://www.china.org.cn/english/2005/Jun/132377.htm.
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respected at the expense of a full account of reported events. Both cases appear
to have been reported as the public-opinion-shaping part of an initiative to give
the Supreme People’s Court jurisdiction over all appeals in death penalty
cases.103 The death penalty itself continues to be favored by Chinese citizens,104
despite the Teng case and others in which innocent people may well have been
executed105 and perhaps in small part because of a sense that legal reforms have
103 See Calum MacLeod, China Plans To Use Death Penalty More Sparingly, USA
TODAY, May 16, 2006, http://usatoday30.usatoday.com/news/world/2006-05-15-chinadeath_x.htm; COMM. AGAINST TORTURE, CONSIDERATION OF REPORTS SUBMITTED BY
STATES PARTIES UNDER ARTICLE 19 OF THE CONVENTION 3 (2008), available at
http://www2.ohchr.org/english/bodies/cat/docs/CAT.C.CHN.CO.4.pdf.
104 Zi Heng Lim, Why China Executes So Many People, ATLANTIC (May 9, 2013, 9:30
AM), http://www.theatlantic.com/china/archive/2013/05/why-china-executes-so-many-peo
ple/275695/.
105 China Murderer Awaits Trial After Innocent Man Executed: Report, SINO DAILY
(Aug. 5, 2009), http://www.sinodaily.com/reports/China_murderer_awaits_trial_after_inno
cent_man_executed_report_999.html (“Hugejiletu was put to death in June 1996 for the rape
and murder of a woman in the toilet of a textile factory in Hohhot, capital of the northern
region of Inner Mongolia, the Beijing News reported. Hugejiletu, who had reported the case
to police, had maintained he was innocent despite attempts to get him to confess. In October
2005, a man named Zhao Zhihong was arrested by police and confessed to killing 10 people
in Inner Mongolia, including the woman murdered in the factory, the state-run newspaper
said.”); Jiabao Du, Failing Trust in China’s Courts: Is Wang Shujin the Last Straw?, TEA
LEAF NATION (July 8, 2013), http://www.tealeafnation.com/2013/07/failing-public-trust-inchinas-courts/ (“In 2005, Wang Shujin was arrested and confessed to four cases of murder
and rape, including that of Nie Shubin’s case, stunning the entire country and the Nie family.
However, this twist of fate has not, as of yet, affected Nie Shubin’s case. In an interview
with the Oriental Morning Post on June 25, Zhang Huanzhi said she has gone to the High
Court of Hebei Province every month for the past eight years to appeal to overturn her son’s
sentence and she has always been told to ‘wait for notice at home.’ The public and legal
scholars suspect that Nie Shubin was wronged because the courts have been delaying their
response. Nie Shubin was convicted based solely on his confession – which many believe
was forced. Aside from his oral confession, prosecutors did not prove his guilt with
witnesses or physical evidence such as fingerprints, blood, or semen. In recent years, many
staggering injustices similar to Nie’s case have come to light. In part due to assuming
suspects are guilty and requiring that their innocence be proven, instead of the other way
around, Chinese courts have maintained a very high conviction rate—99.9% in 2009,
according to official statistics—so it is no surprise that some of those who stand trial are
wrongly convicted. In March 2013, Zhang Hui and Zhang Gaoping were released from jail
after serving 10 years for being convicted of raping and killing a girl whom they gave a free
ride. In 2011, a famous lawyer named Zhu Mingyong and a respected prosecutor named
Zhang Biao succeeded in soliciting the High Court in Hangzhou City in Zhejiang Province
to reinvestigate and retry the case. It was found that the DNA left in the victim’s nails
matched the DNA of a criminal who was convicted of rape and murder and executed in
2005. The Zhangs said they were tortured for multiple consecutive days and nights to
confess. In May 2010, Zhao Zuohai was released from jail after serving 11 years because the
victim named Zhao Zhenshang whom he was convicted of murdering in 1999 returned. It
was found that the victim’s body had been misidentified by the family as Zhao Zhenshang.
In May 2005, after serving 11 years, She Xianglin was acquitted because his wife, whom he
was charged with murdering in 1995, went back home for a visit. She had moved to another
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been made that might prevent innocent people from being executed in the
future.
The CPC has also allowed a wrenching widespread societal debate within
China about how Chinese people should treat each other, in terms of offering
assistance to strangers. I noticed, while traveling and living there, that China
does not seem to have a very vibrant culture of Samaritanism. When I asked
Chinese people about this, they unerringly told me the Parable of the Nanjing
Judge. Around 2006 an unnamed Nanjing judge “made headlines . . . when he
blamed a good Samaritan for knocking an old lady over in the street because
‘common sense’ meant only the guilty help the injured.”106 By one account:
[A] young person named Peng Yu . . . kindly helped up an old woman who had
fallen down, and at the request of the old woman took her to the hospital. The
result was that this old woman then maintained that it was Peng Yu who [was]
the person who had knocked her down. Peng Yu strongly denied that he
knocked over the old woman. Both sides eventually went to court and Peng Yu
was fined in the first instance to bear a portion of the old woman’s medical
expensies [sic], totally [sic] over 40,000 yuan, on the basis “common sense”
that: “According to society’s logic/reason, if Peng Yu was doing a good deed,
Peng Yu could have let the old woman’s family send her to the hospital after
they arrived, and then leave on his own. However Peng Yu did not make such
a choice, and his actions contradict what is reasonable”; “Peng Yu, on the day
of the incident, paid the old woman over 200 yuan and even did not request
that the old woman pay him back”; etc.107

This incident triggered massive online discussions, with one website’s blog
homepage claiming that a survey had ascertained that 80% of bloggers had
chosen not to be good people anymore as a result.108 This Nanjing judge
story109 continues to be invoked by some people in China to justify not helping
strangers in distress; others raise it to call for changes in the culture. In 2011 a
video of a two-year-old girl getting struck by a vehicle in a hit-and-run accident
province and remarried. In April 1994, the police found a body and determined it was She
Xianglin’s wife and that he had killed her. She Xianglin said he was tortured for ten days
and ten nights. Other well-known injustices include Du Peiwu’s case, Wu Daquan’s,
Hutengjile’s, Zhang Zhenfeng’s, and Teng Xingshan’s. These and other cases continue to
erode the Chinese people’s belief in their judiciary and government. Wrote Xu Xin, ‘Nie
Shubin’s case might be the last straw that causes the judiciary to collapse.’”). See generally
id.
106 Only the Guilty Help the Injured: Legacy of the “Nanjing Judge” All Too Apparent
as Passers-By Ignore Hit-Run Toddler, SYDNEY MORNING HERALD, Oct. 19, 2011,
http://www.smh.com.au/world/only-the-guilty-help-the-injured-legacy-of-the-nanjing-judgeall-too-apparent-as-passersby-ignore-hitrun-toddler-20111019-1m6sv.html.
107 Fauna, Bystanders Only Help After Old Man Says He Fell by Himself,
CHINASMACK (Feb. 25, 2009), http://www.chinasmack.com/2009/stories/bystanders-onlyhelp-after-old-man-says-he-fell-by-himself.html.
108 Id.
109 Id.
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in China and then being ignored by more than a dozen passers-by as she lay
critically injured on the road went viral and sparked another substantial round of
online debate.110 In 2012 an American college student studying in China was
broadly praised in the media and on social networking platforms because he
bought some food for a poor old woman who was begging.111 Chinese people
again engaged in extensive discussions, sometimes exhorting each other to
engage in similar small acts of kindness. But then in 2013 accounts of innocent
women who got kidnapped and murdered after unadvisedly offering assistance
to criminals who faked distress were widely publicized, with the clear message
that helping strangers can be a very risky endeavor.112 Whether any part of this
debate is being steered by the CPC is not known, but certainly a lot of diverse
and passionate viewpoints have been on display, with little defense of the
anonymous but government-employed CPC member Nanjing Judge.
What the CPC will not tolerate are targeted efforts to foment revolution or
otherwise undermine Party authority. It’s generally understood that
unauthorized coordinated outdoor gatherings are forbidden, and are met with
110 See Apathy Toward Injured Child Sparks Public Outcry in China, XINHUA (Oct. 17,
2011), http://news.xinhuanet.com/english2010/china/2011-10/17/c_131196451.htm; Joshua
Norman, After Toddler Is Left To Die, China Disquieted, CBS NEWS (Oct. 17, 2011, 9:51
PM), http://www.cbsnews.com/8301-503543_162-20121691-503543.html; Outcry in China
over Hit-and-Run Toddler Left in Street, BBC NEWS (Oct. 17, 2011), http://www.bbc.co.uk/
news/world-asia-pacific-15331773; Toddler’s Survival Unlikely, CHINA DAILY, Oct. 17,
2011, http://china.org.cn/china/2011-10/17/content_23641415.htm.
111 See Anthony Bond, American Becomes Chinese Internet Sensation After Buying
Homeless Woman French Fries on Street (Shame She Didn’t Like Them!), MAIL ONLINE
(June 1, 2012), http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-2153119/American-Chinese-inter
net-sensation-buying-homeless-woman-French-fries-street-shame-didn-t-like-them.html;
Jonathan Kaiman, American a Hero in China After Giving Homeless Woman French Fries,
L.A. TIMES, May 9, 2012, http://latimesblogs.latimes.com/world_now/2012/05/beijing-anamerican-student-in-nanjing-has-shot-to-fame-on-the-chinese-internet-after-buying-a-pack
et-of-mcdonalds-french.html; US Student Becomes Viral Hit in China for Sharing His Fries,
MSN NOW (June 6, 2012), http://now.msn.com/us-student-becomes-viral-hit-in-china-forsharing-his-fries; cf. China Rape Victim’s Mother Begins Court Case, GLOBALPOST (Apr.
12, 2013), http://www.globalpost.com/dispatch/news/afp/130412/china-rape-victims-moth
er-begins-court-case.
112 See Michelle Florcruz, Attack and Murder of Chinese Teenager Draws Additional
Fears of Being a Good Samaritan, INT’L BUS. TIMES (Aug. 1, 2013, 12:55 PM),
http://www.ibtimes.com/attack-murder-chinese-teenager-draws-additional-fears-being-goodsamaritan-1368447 (“Wednesday, news broke of a teenager in China who was lured by a
pregnant woman pretending to be in distress, only to later be assaulted and murdered by the
woman and her husband. The story hit local Chinese media a day before the southern city of
Shenzhen rolled out a new ‘Good Persons Law,’ which protects those who opt to be a Good
Samaritan and help others. The episode will likely fuel China’s growing phobia of helping
strangers.” (citation omitted)); see also Fauna, Pregnant Wife Cons Young Girl for
Husband’s Sexual Needs, CHINASMACK (Aug. 1, 2013), http://www.chinasmack.com/2013/
stories/pregnant-wife-cons-young-girl-for-husbands-sexual-needs.html; Liu Yuanhui, Girl
Killed After Attempted Rape, CRIENGLISH.COM (Aug. 1, 2013), http://english.cri.cn/6909/
2013/08/01/2561s779363.htm.
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violence and arrests, because in 1989 the world watched the CPC respond
repressively to the Tiananmen Square Uprising, until the government seized all
of the cameras and evicted or arrested the reporters. What is less widely
recognized is that smaller scale protests occur in some part of China every day.
Because the mainstream media in China is controlled by the CPC, these
incidents are not reported by the domestic press, but information about at least
some of them makes its way into foreign newspapers, or is succinctly and
somewhat opaquely communicated via social media platforms. I personally
witnessed several large demonstrations that resulted in the appearance of
numerous police cars in Shanghai, Beijing, Urumqi, Chengdu and Hangzhou.
Because I could not read Chinese, and was afraid to take pictures or approach
strangers to ask questions, I don’t have a good sense of what most of the
disputes were about. I know that at least one was related to religion and two to
land disputes with the government. One involved the death of a man while he
was in police custody. They were not covered in the English versions of the
Chinese press or in any international press venue as far as I could ascertain. In
every case protesters were unambiguously dispersed or taken into custody by
authorities. The CPC seems determined to prevent mass gatherings of people in
furtherance of common goals, regardless of what the goals may be. There are
even large contingents of People’s Liberation Army soldiers at Chinese athletic
events, apparently there to make sure the crowds in attendance are not diverted
to other purposes, while public safety issues are addressed by local police
officers.
All this obviously does not dissuade everyone from activism, though. By
one account there are 180,000 “mass incidents” of protest every year.113 In the
autumn of 2011 an entire fishing village in Guangdong province, Wukan, rose
in insurrection and drove CPC officials out of its borders to protest violence and
corruption related to confiscations of land, and remained in conflict with the
government for months.114 This affair was not mentioned by official Chinese
news outlets while it was happening, and references to it were censored from
the Internet, but everyone I spoke to in China seemed to know about it. The
Communist Party Secretary who had an office and leadership position in the
law school where I was posted (Tongji University Law School) was away
during this interval, reportedly involved with negotiations in Wukan by some
accounts, but he relayed a different reason to me for his absence, which had
required him to cancel a visit to his son’s school he had scheduled for me. After
the situation was defused, however, the problem was publicly attributed to
corrupt actions by bad apple CPC officials acting outside the scope of their
authority.115 Once the central government in Beijing was made aware of the
113 Malcolm Moore, Inside Wukan: The Chinese Village That Fought Back, TELEGRAPH,
Dec. 13, 2011, http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/asia/china/8954315/Inside-Wuk
an-the-Chinese-village-that-fought-back.html.
114 Id.
115 See Amy Silverstein, Wukan Rebellion: China Punishes 20 Officials in Response to
Village Protest, GLOBALPOST (Apr. 24, 2012), http://www.globalpost.com/dispatch/news/re
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situation, the CPC account averred: it was rectified.116 Accepting this official
account of events was probably a very savvy move on the part of the people of
Wukan. I do not know if there were later repercussions.
There are smaller and subtler acts of protest as well. Many times as I
entered or left the gates of Tongji University during the 2011–2012 academic
year I passed by people in small groups or alone who held handmade posters
and handed out papers expressing some political view or personal grievance. In
one instance I was informed by several students that protesters were expressing
opposition to the Communist Party Secretary in residence at Tongji University
Law School, though on what basis I do not know, because the students I asked
were unwilling to discuss the details with me beyond saying, “They do not think
he is good.”
On one occasion I took a group of about thirty Tongji law students to the
U.S. Consulate in Shanghai to observe rounds of a moot court competition
being held there. A law school faculty member also accompanied us, naturally.
We all took the subway together and then as we walked to the appropriate
building several students suggested that group photos be taken. Everyone lined
up on some stairs, and students asked a passing stranger to take some pictures
so that everybody could be in them. As she was working her way through the
numerous cameras lined up at her feet, a police officer appeared and ordered us
to disperse. The law professor who had come along began walking toward him
to explain who we were and what we were doing there, but before he had a
chance the woman juggling the cameras yelled in a stentorian voice, “We are
citizens of Shanghai and we can stand on the sidewalk and take photos if we
want to!” Or at least I was told that is what she shouted by my students, while
they cheered and burst into applause at these unexpected words of resistance,
just as a group of students being pointlessly hassled by a police officer in the
United States might do. It was a small and unexpectedly emotional moment of
bonding across cultures that I will never forget.
On a far less happy or inspiring note, in July of 2013 a man set off a bomb
in the Beijing airport. The New York Times account of the incident stated in
pertinent part:
According to documents posted on the Internet, Mr. Ji, who had earned his
living transporting people on a motorcycle, was paralyzed from the waist down
in 2005 after security officers in the southern city of Dongguan beat him for
operating an unlicensed transport service. In a petition letter detailing his

gions/asia-pacific/china/120424/wukan-rebellion-china-punishes-20-officials-response;
Steven Jiang, Symbol of Wukan Rebellion Ends Her Political Career, CNN (Mar. 5, 2012),
http://articles.cnn.com/2012-03-04/asia/world_asia_china-wukan_1_village-political-careercommunist-party?_s=PM:ASIA.
116 See Silverstein, supra note 115; Jiang, supra note 115.
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plight, Mr. Ji said he had been left with $16,000 in medical bills. “Almost
without hope, petition road endless,” he wrote at one point.117

The article is a lot more sympathetic toward the accused bomber than one
typically witnesses in an article about what might reasonably be characterized
as an act of terrorism. Official Chinese accounts were quite different,
equivocating about whether his injury was caused by a beating or an unrelated
motorcycle accident, and whether he had received justice from the Chinese
legal system.118
Now consider another stunning example of political protest involving the
rigging of financial markets:
China experienced a bizarre numerological happening [on June 4, 2012].
The Shanghai Composite Index started [the] morning at 2346.98, which, when
read from right to left, shared an uncanny similarity to [the day’s] highly
sensitive anniversary: twenty-three years since the June 4, 1989, crackdown on
pro-democracy demonstrations in Beijing, an event known in Chinese as “sixfour.”119

The possibility that this was a coincidence seemed small indeed when six
hours later, the numbers struck again, and the market closed the day down 64.89
points.120 Sitting in my apartment in Shanghai while this unfolded, I couldn’t
decide which was more remarkable, the fact that someone had probably risked
her life to make a political point by manipulating the market, or the fact that the
market was hackable generally, which was surely very alarming to investors
who couldn’t care less about China’s long term prospects for democracy.
References to the Shanghai Stock Exchange, the Shanghai Composite Index and
117 Andrew Jacobs, Former Motorcycle Driver, Paralyzed in Beating, Sets Off Bomb at
Beijing Airport, N.Y. TIMES, July 20, 2013, http://www.nytimes.com/2013/07/21/world/
asia/former-motorcycle-driver-paralyzed-in-beating-sets-off-bomb-at-beijing-airport.html?_
r=0.
118 Zheng Caiziong & An Baijie, Guangdong To Probe Airport Bomber’s Allegations,
CHINA DAILY, July 22, 2013, http://usa.chinadaily.com.cn/china/2013-07/22/content_
16808897.htm; Beijing Airport Bomber’s “Mistreatment” Case Reopened, S. CHINA
MORNING POST (July 22, 2013), http://www.scmp.com/news/china/article/1287995/beijingairport-bombers-mistreatment-case-reopened; Li Qian, Early Warning from Beijing Bomb
Man, SHANGHAI DAILY, July 22, 2013, http://english.sina.com/china/2013/0721/61074
3.html.
119 What Happened on the Shanghai Stock Exchange?, NEW YORKER (June 5, 2012),
http://www.newyorker.com/online/blogs/evanosnos/2012/06/what-happened-on-the-shang
hai-stock-exchange.html (emphasis omitted).
120 See NTDTV, Bizarre Stock Market Numbers “Commemorate” China’s Tiananmen
Massacre, YOUTUBE (June 4, 2012), http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=j479cI82OSg; What
Happened on the Shanghai Stock Exchange?, supra note 119; Keith Bradsher, Market’s
Echo of Tiananmen Date Sets Off Censors, N.Y. TIMES, June 4, 2012, http://www.nytimes.
com/2012/06/05/world/asia/anniversary-of-tiananmen-crackdown-echos-through-shanghaimarket.html?pagewanted=all.
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many related terms were reportedly censored from Chinese Internet. Unlike
during the Wukan event, where I was thrown off the Internet every time I
searched for related information while the protest was unfolding, I was able to
follow the story in real time using my Virtual Private Network (VPN) for a few
hours, before the filtering became more effective. I wondered whether my
students knew anything about this, but it was not the sort of thing I asked them
about and none of them raised it. I did inquire of one of my faculty monitors,
who confirmed that he was aware it had happened, but quickly changed the
subject.
Finally, high profile Chinese dissidents such as artist Ai Weiwei risk their
lives and those of their families and friends by openly criticizing the Chinese
government. Ai Weiwei has a high enough profile that the CPC seems reluctant
to permanently remove him from public view.121 The same is not true for his
friends, however, several of whom are “missing.”122 His lawyers have also been
detained incommunicado, or worse, to prevent them from effectively
representing Ai Weiwei on tax charges and other matters.123 Practitioners of
Falun Gong similarly put themselves at risk, as is evidenced by this CPCsanctioned report of Falun Gong being arrested for faking torture photos.124
Readers are clearly supposed to conclude that any evidence of physical abuse
proffered by Falun Gong has been fabricated, and also to absorb the more

121 See generally Ai Weiwei, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 12, 2013, http://topics.nytimes.com/top/
reference/timestopics/people/a/ai_weiwei/index.html.
122 See Tiffany Ap, Four of Ai Weiwei’s Friends Have Also Been Missing for Weeks
New Reports Say, SHANGHAIIST (May 23, 2011, 3:30 PM), http://shanghaiist.com/2011/
05/23/four_of_ai_weiweis_friends_have_als.php; Concern for Missing Chinese Artist Ai
Weiwei, AL JAZEERA (Apr. 5, 2011, 8:46 AM), http://www.aljazeera.com/news/asia-pacific/
2011/04/20114565222165221.html.
123 See Adam Martin, Lawyer for Ai Weiwei Is Released from Detention, ATLANTIC
WIRE (Apr. 19, 2011), http://www.theatlanticwire.com/global/2011/04/lawyer-detainedchinese-artist-emerges-hiding/36839/ (“The attorney, Liu Xiaoyuan, is one of a handful of
notable Chinese lawyers who have disappeared since February, according to the Guardian.
‘Some of those, including Teng Biao, Li Tiantian and Liu Shihui, are still unaccounted for.
Others are thought to have had their movements restricted.’”); Ai Weiwei Arrest: Chinese
Lawyer and Designer Are Latest To Disappear, GUARDIAN, Apr. 15, 2011, http://www.guar
dian.co.uk/world/2011/apr/15/ai-weiwei-lawyer-designer-disappear; Ai Weiwei’s Lawyer
Was Missing as the Tax Hearing Approaches, GLOBAL VOICES (June 21, 2012),
http://globalvoicesonline.org/2012/06/21/ai-weiweis-lawyer-was-missing-as-the-tax-hearin
g-approaches/; cf. Melissa Chan, Chatting with China’s Security Apparatus, AL JAZEERA
(Mar. 8, 2012), http://blogs.aljazeera.com/blog/asia/chatting-chinas-security-apparatus (“Al
Jazeera’s team decided to speak to rights attorney Pu Zhiqiang, known for his work
representing Ai Weiwei and himself an object of frequent police surveillance, to solicit his
opinion. What happened next was not surprising, but on this day, felt particularly ironic:
plainclothes police officers prevented us from interviewing Pu on camera, even as we
explained to them that this new legislation would curtail their state security powers.”).
124 16 Falun Gong Practitioners Arrested, SHANGHAI DAILY, June 4, 2013,
http://www.shanghaidaily.com/national/16-Falun-Gong-practitioners-arrested/shdaily.shtml.

882

OHIO STATE LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 74:6

generalized information that depicting torture online and blaming the
government for it may bring one into conflict with the authorities.
Most experts believe that the only way China will become more democratic
is via reforms within the CPC, rather than from outside pressure.125 Chinese
leaders are unable to prevent events that pressure them to make changes, but
they can control the flow of information about these events to a surprising
degree, and they will not relinquish any of their power over communications
lightly. They may, if sufficiently motivated, decide to wield this power to create
more privacy within the culture, or simply to create a greater illusion of privacy.
But their self-protective instincts are very strong.

C. Individual Concerns
As noted above, Chinese law provides a right of reputation such that “[i]f a
citizen’s right of personal name, portrait, reputation or honour is infringed upon,
he shall have the right to demand that the infringement be stopped, his
reputation be rehabilitated, the ill effects be eliminated and an apology be made;
he may also demand compensation for losses.”126 There are accounts in the
Chinese media of private citizens prevailing in court over those who had lied
about them. Usually the facts in these reports are fairly extreme and somewhat
improbable; such as one in which a person was accused of causing an accident
when in fact he had rendered first aid to someone who was hurt and even got
injured himself in the process of assisting the victim.127 Stories like this are
understood by Chinese citizens to be cautionary tales intended to influence
behavior. In this case, the message is that liars are found out and punished, so
people should not be dishonest. It also serves as a rhetorical justification for
proactive censorship; since spreading lies publicly would have only hurt an
innocent party.
Other times the cases seem real, as with this report:
China’s landmark [Internet privacy] case occurred in 2008 after the “death
blog” of a woman named Jiang Yan. Her blog depicted the sorrow she felt
about her husband Wang Fei’s extramarital affair. Jiang later killed herself,
leading to outrage at Wang Fei on the Chinese Internet, prompting a Human
Flesh Search. The search dug up his personal information and place of
employment, leading to public harassment and offline protests that caused
Wang Fei to lose his job. After Wang sued popular websites Daqi.com,
Tianya.com, and a netizen named Zhang Leyi for emotional distress, a court

125 For example, see the body of works on China by James Fallows, Peter Hessler, Evan

Osnos and Jeffrey Wasserstrom. See generally WASSERSTROM, supra note 89.
126 Jingchun, supra note 2, at 658.
127 See id. at 657 (discussing the Wang example).
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ruled in favor of Wang and ordered Daqi.com and Zhang to pay out 8,000
RMB (about US $1,160).128

The publication of this potentially verifiable story seems to be a warning
against public vigilantism, which is an increasing concern of the CPC,
especially when it is related to accusations of corruption by CPC members. The
CPC would prefer to police its own members outside the view of the public, but
understandably hesitates to say this directly.
Individuals within the CPC leadership clearly understand the importance of
privacy generally, and most particularly to themselves. Status, power and “face”
(reputation) are matters of acute personal concern. Individual criticisms are very
deeply feared by party leaders. It is said that “in ancient Chinese society, the
rights enjoyed by a person were accorded in relation to one’s social status and
one’s status in the family system.”129 Certainly CPC leaders enjoy the practical
ability to control communications about themselves far more than most
Chinese. They can also punish speakers who displease them. By some accounts,
the harshness of the response to the Tiananmen Uprising was driven by anger
over personal attacks against Deng Xiao Ping and other leaders in the chants
and slogans used by protesters.
One internet researcher determined that the largest share of blocked words
on China’s largest social media platform are the names of CPC members.
“[P]rotection from criticism on Weibo seems to be a perk for rising up the
ranks” of the Communist Party, he concluded.130
Much more recently, Bloomberg News and Business Week were blocked
from Chinese Internet after reporting on the extensive wealth of Xi Jinping’s
family in the Spring of 2012.131 The New York Times was blocked in October of
2012 after publishing reports about the exorbitant wealth of Wen Jiabao’s
family.132 The conclusion that family wealth is something these men did not
want to have disclosed is inescapable. The reasons why this information is
viewed as sensitive are not hard to guess, as the reported facts surrounding the
acquisitions of these vast fortunes suggest political corruption.

128 Vincent Capone, In Chinese Netizen Outrage, Echoes of Mao-Era Struggle, TEA
LEAF NATION (Sept. 4, 2012), http://www.tealeafnation.com/2012/09/in-chinese-netizenoutrage-echoes-of-mao-era-struggle/.
129 WANG, supra note 43, at 37.
130 JASON Q. NG, BLOCKED ON WEIBO: WHAT GETS SUPPRESSED ON CHINA’S VERSION
OF TWITTER (AND WHY) xviii (2013).
131 Bloomberg Sites Blocked in China Days After Xi Family Wealth Story, REUTERS,
July 4, 2012, available at http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/07/04/us-china-censorshipbloomberg-idUSBRE86306820120704; China Blocks Bloomberg Site After Report on
Leader, BLOOMBERG BUSINESSWEEK (June 29, 2012), http://www.businessweek.com/ap/
2012-06-29/china-blocks-bloomberg-site-after-report-on-leader.
132 Keith Bradsher, China Blocks Web Access to Times After Article, N.Y. TIMES, Oct.
25, 2012, http://www.nytimes.com/2012/10/26/world/asia/china-blocks-web-access-to-newyork-times.html; WANG, supra note 43, at 92.
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Previous negative reporting about China by these news organizations had
been more general, and (apparently) less objectionable, but also fairly extensive.
All three of those outlets had reported about hot button topics including
Tiananmen, Tibet, Taiwan, Falun Gong, Wukan, the Bo Xilai scandal in
Chongqing and the Shanghai Stock Market weirdness without overarching
repercussions (though of course individual articles were blocked from
distribution). It was only after the exhaustively researched financial information
about the families of the incoming Chinese President and outgoing Chinese
Premier was reported that the entire publications became Internet blockaded on
a wholesale basis. And from what I hear from my friends in China, the
censorship was unusually effective. Educated, politically savvy people knew
something big had happened, but they had a really hard time figuring out what it
was.
CPC leaders also want privacy when using their own phones and
computers, and worry about having their own communications monitored. By
some accounts Bo Xilai, former leader of Chongqing province and rising star in
the CPC, sealed his political downfall and doom by carrying out his own
surveillance campaign of people in the CPC leadership.133 The watchers do not
like to be watched. Part of the reason Google was banned from Chinese Internet
was the impression that the company was inadequately controlling search
results that broadcast private information about CPC leaders and their
families.134

IV. CENSORSHIP, COUNTERFEITING AND CONSUMER PRIVACY
The Chinese media is, as explained above, widely known to be controlled
by the Chinese government. The Chinese people assume that is also true in
nations like the United States because that is what they are told. Stories from the
United States about gun violence dominate the Chinese media’s international
coverage, and Chinese citizens believe this is the tip of a massive undisclosed
iceberg of violence in the United States, as would be the case in China, where
crime stories are significantly underreported for politically instrumental reasons.
Many Chinese people assume they will see gunfights if they visit the United
133 See Ian Johnson & Jonathan Ansfield, Key Figure in Scandal That Felled Bo Xilai Is

Charged, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 5, 2012, http://www.nytimes.com/2012/09/06/world/asia/keyfigure-in-bo-xilai-scandal-is-charged.html?hp (“The report also contended that Mr. Wang
abused power by illegally spying on people. Sources have said the tech-savvy Mr. Wang
wiretapped a wide range of people, including top government leaders, with Mr. Bo’s
approval.”).
134 James Glanz & John Markoff, Vast Hacking by a China Fearful of the Web, N.Y.
TIMES, Dec. 4, 2010, http://www.nytimes.com/2010/12/05/world/asia/05wikileaks-china.
html?pagewanted=all (“But Chinese officials became alarmed that Google still did less than
its Chinese rivals to remove material Chinese officials considered offensive. Such material
included information about Chinese dissidents and human rights issues, but also about
central and provincial Chinese leaders and their children—considered an especially taboo
topic, interviews with people quoted in the cables reveal.”).
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States. Of course, some visitors from China do. And having lost two family
members to gun violence, I am not really inclined to defend the United States
on this issue. But the Chinese media does manipulate coverage of shootings in
the United States to maximize their visceral impact.
Yet against this backdrop of censorship and media distortions, reports in
Chinese media of police crackdowns on the counterfeiting of trademarked and
copyrighted goods are frequent, as are journalistic accounts of Chinese
companies litigating intellectual property disputes in Chinese courts. The
government does this for some end, but it is not clear that reducing
counterfeiting is the actual goal. Counterfeit markets operate openly in every
Chinese city I visited, and students routinely used unauthorized photocopies or
PDF files in the place of textbooks at every university where I gave lectures.
My impression is that the CPC is trying to signal internationally that it is
complying with its treaty obligations, without actually changing the extremely
profitable counterfeiting culture of China to any substantial degree. Certainly
some of my students thought that foreign companies were given unfair
advantages in the Chinese courts, based on news reports that foreign companies
prevailed in the majority of intellectual property related court cases that resulted
in verdicts.135 They acknowledged, though, that assertions of disproportionate
legal success by foreigners could not be verified by a list of cases or by any
other relevant criteria. Perhaps the news accounts which said that foreigners
were successfully defending their intellectual property rights in China were
themselves supposed to motivate future intellectual property law compliance.
This is not to suggest, however, that the Chinese government is all talk and no
135 See Zhao Wen, Foreign Firms Winning Most Infringement Trials, SHANGHAI DAILY,

Apr. 26, 2012, http://www.shanghaidaily.com/Metro/society/Foreign-firms-winning-mostinfringement-trials/shdaily.shtml (“About 86 percent of foreign companies won their
lawsuits over infringement of their intellectual properties in Shanghai last year, according to
a white paper released by the Shanghai Higher People’s Court yesterday. According to the
paper, Shanghai courts settled 147 foreign-related infringement cases that went to trial last
year, with more than 71.16 million yuan (US$11.29 million) involved. Judges ruled on 65
cases with 56 in favor of foreign companies, the paper said. In one case, Diageo, the maker
of Johnnie Walker, won 120,000 yuan compensation from two Chinese companies that used
the Scotch whisky’s name on their olive oil skin-care products. Last year, Shanghai courts
accepted 174 infringement cases involving parties from Hong Kong, Macau, Taiwan and
foreign countries such as the United States, France and Japan. The number was 16.3 percent
lower than in 2010.”); cf. Esther H. Lim & C. Brandon Rash, China Court Swiftly Enforces
U.S. Company’s IP Rights Against Chinese Company in Motorola v. Guangzhou Weierwei,
LEXIS NEXIS CHINA LEGAL REV., Mar. 2008, available at http://www.finnegan.com/re
sources/articles/articlesdetail.aspx?news=ac1bec74-c483-4f26-8202-e603d78626fa;
More
Foreign Companies Involved in China IPR Suits, CHINA POST (July 16, 2013), http://www.
chinapost.com.tw/business/asia-china/2013/07/16/383812/More-foreign.htm (discussing the
increase in intellectual property lawsuits involving foreign companies); Brian Safran,
Challenging the Presumption that China Is Weak on Intellectual Property, ATLANTICCOMMUNITY.ORG (July 5, 2010), http://archive.atlantic-community.org/index/articles/
view/Challenging_the_Presumption_that_China_is_Weak_on_Intellectual_Property.
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action, when it comes to controlling foreign creative works, as will be seen
below.

A. Chinese Censorship Affects Film Content Worldwide
Consider the case of foreign movies. Movies from the United States and
other nations are actively censored by CPC actors. If particular movies are not
authorized for distribution by the Chinese government, they cannot be lawfully
shown in theaters in China, and the only copies that circulate are illegal in a
criminal law sense as well as unauthorized in a copyright law sense. The
Chinese government selects only thirty-four foreign films for domestic
distribution each year.136 The censorship guidelines of China’s State
Administration of Radio, Film and Television include:
[P]rohibitions against “disturbing social orders and harming the social
stability,” “violations against the fundamental principle of the Constitution,”
and “promoting obsceneness, gambling and violence.”
The rules also forb[id] content such as “murders, violence, horrors, ghosts
and demons, supernaturalism . . . value orientations confusing the real and the
fake, the innocent and the evil, and the beautiful and the ugly.”137

China is a market that can generate $50 million in revenues for a popular
movie.138 Films that offend the government censors for any reason have no
chance of being officially distributed in China.139 For this reason producers who
hope to have films on China’s approved list will engage in substantive edits and
rewrites to please the CPC censors in Beijing.140 For example:
When aliens besiege Earth in Universal Pictures’ recent action film
“Battleship,” it is the Chinese authorities in Hong Kong whom Washington
credits with delivering the early proof that these invaders aren’t exactly
homegrown.
But those aren’t the only Chinese do-gooders on screen these days.
136 Mark McDonald, Beijing’s Censors Could Test the Mettle of Iron Man, N.Y. TIMES
BLOG (July 17, 2012, 12:32 AM), http://rendezvous.blogs.nytimes.com/2012/07/17/beijingscensors-could-test-the-mettle-of-iron-man/?_r=0.
137 Steven Zeitchik & Jonathan Landreth, Hollywood Gripped by Pressure System from
China, L.A. TIMES, June 12, 2012, http://articles.latimes.com/2012/jun/12/entertainment/laet-china-censorship-20120612.
138 McDonald, supra note 136 (“One film-industry expert said Chinese moviegoers can
bump a film’s box-office receipts by as much as $50 million.”).
139 Cf. Patrick Brzeski, China’s Looming Entertainment Problem: Not Enough Lawyers,
HOLLYWOOD REP. (June 21, 2013), http://www.hollywoodreporter.com/thr-esq/chinaslooming-entertainment-problem-not-572629.
140 See McDonald, supra note 136 (“With fewer than three dozen foreign films allowed
onto mainland screens each year, there is tremendous competition among studios and
filmmakers to get on the approved list. They do this by pleasing (or not offending) the
censors in Beijing. Hence the edits and the rewrites.”).
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In “Salmon Fishing in the Yemen,” a romantic comedy about building a
dam in the Mideast, Chinese hydroelectric engineers showed off their knowhow; the original book included no such characters. In Columbia Pictures’
disaster movie “2012,” the White House chief of staff extolled the Chinese as
visionaries after an ark built by the country’s scientists saves civilization.
In fact, references to the Middle Kingdom are popping up with remarkable
frequency in movies these days. Some are conspicuously flattering or
gratuitous additions designed to satisfy Chinese business partners and court
audiences in the largest moviegoing market outside the U.S. Others,
filmmakers say, are simply organic reflections of the fact that China is a rising
political, economic and cultural power.
Meanwhile, Chinese bad guys are vanishing—literally. Western studios
are increasingly inclined to excise potentially negative references to China in
the hope that the films can pass muster with Chinese censors and land one of
several dozen coveted annual revenue-sharing import quota slots in Chinese
cinemas.
MGM, the studio behind the remake of the 1984 movie “Red Dawn,” last
year digitally altered the invaders attacking the U.S. to make them North
Koreans instead of Chinese, as originally shot.141

Even if a foreign film, or one made by foreign entities in partnership with
Chinese firms, is allowed into distribution, it still may be a specially censored
version of the work, with the original version accessible only via unauthorized
means.142 Chinese movie fans may well go to Chinese movie theaters with the
expectation that they will be viewing an edited-for-China film.143 U.S. movies
are sometimes very popular with Chinese theatergoers nonetheless.144
If a foreign film is not one of the approved thirty-four movies, it can only be
viewed in China as a (probable145) act of copyright infringement, via illegal
download, or bootleg DVD. While the Chinese government will affirmatively
keep large numbers of foreign films away from Chinese citizens by refusing to
allow them into authorized distribution, it is much less likely to take action to

141 Zeitchik & Landreth, supra note 137.
142 See id.
143 See id. (“A few years ago, comments on Chinese pop culture website douban.com

and movie review site MTime.com regularly reflected the game of ‘gotcha’ that Chinese
film fans played with censors. People would buy pirated discs or download uncensored
versions of Hollywood films, then comment online about what was missing from the
versions in Chinese theaters.”).
144 In 2012, Hollywood took 50% of Chinese ticket sales for the first time, based on only
twenty releases. Dan Harris, Media Piracy and the End of Chinese Cultural Exceptionalism?
Part 2 of 3: What Everyone Wants, CHINA L. BLOG (July 13, 2013), http://www.chinalaw
blog.com/2013/07/media-piracy-and-the-end-of-chinese-cultural-exceptionalism-part-2-of3-what-everyone-wants.html.
145 Unless it qualifies as fair use or some other exemption under Chinese law.
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limit unauthorized distributions of unauthorized films via the Internet or
counterfeiting networks.146
When the government permits their distribution, it may authorize (in a
copyright sense) uncut copies of foreign films to be purchased legitimately, but
I could not ascertain whether this actually happens. Authorized movies reap
income from theatrical release in China, but it is not clear that Chinese
consumers prefer to purchase legal DVDs or downloads when that is an option,
assuming it ever is an option.147 This may be related to costs, and possibly also
convenience if counterfeit DVDs are more easily obtained than legitimate ones,
which was certainly my impression. In Shanghai counterfeit movie stores were
common and carts vending counterfeit movies (and books and CDs) could be
found on almost every street corner. At every university I visited in China
counterfeit DVDs could be conveniently purchased right on campus. No one I
asked, and I mean no one, knew where I could go to confidently purchase
authorized, noninfringing copies of foreign movies.
Any preference by Chinese people for bootlegs of officially sanctioned
movies as against authorized DVDs probably isn’t typically directly linked to
concerns about intellectual confidentiality or desires to have viewing
preferences remain private. Once a film earns the approval of the government
censors it seems unlikely that anyone would be judged negatively for watching
it. It is possible, however, that someone known to watch only foreign films
might in some circumstances be accused of lacking patriotism for failing to
support domestic movies. But that is unlikely to be a serious problem, given the
popularity of foreign brands of consumer goods in China generally.
Copyright infringement by consumers in the United States has sometimes
been linked to a desire for privacy, when the unauthorized downloading or
viewing of infringing content was mistakenly believed to be private in nature,
particularly pornography. The U.S. government has almost no interest in
policing online pornography as long as the performers are adults.148
Pornographers, however, have created profitable business models based on
identifying unauthorized downloaders of their pornography, and then suing
them for copyright infringement.149 Many of the downloaders settle quickly to
avoid having their names published in association with pornography that may

146 See Dan Harris, The End of Chinese Cultural Exceptionalism? Part 3 of 3: Forget It,

Jack, It’s Chinatown, CHINA L. BLOG (July 14, 2013), http://www.chinalawblog.com/2013/
07/the-end-of-chinese-cultural-exceptionalism-part-3-of-3-forget-it-jack-its-chinatown.html.
147 See Jacqui Cheng, Paramount and Warner Bros. Market $3 DVDs in China,
UNCATEGORIZED (Nov. 7, 2007, 2:27 PM), http://arstechnica.com/uncategorized/2007/11/
paramount-and-warner-bros-market-3-dvds-in-china/.
148 See Ann Bartow, Copyright Law and Pornography, 91 OR. L. REV. 1, 17 (2012)
[hereinafter Bartow, Copyright Law]; Ann Bartow, Pornography, Coercion, and Copyright
Law 2.0, 10 VAND. J. ENT. & TECH. L. 799, 801 (2008).
149 See Bartow, Copyright Law, supra note 148, at 3.
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be violent or racist and often is both.150 In China, pornography is illegal but
informally tolerated.151 As with copyright infringement, one assumes the CPC
has the tools to enforce the laws but lacks either the courage or the desire to do
so.

B. Uploading, Downloading and Piratical Diversions
“Piracy” as a means to access unapproved foreign films does not seem to
particularly worry the Chinese government. If it did, there would be a
crackdown that would also have the salutary effect of demonstrating to
countries like the United States that it was actively combatting copyright
infringement. Because piracy tools also facilitate the distribution of
unauthorized domestic movies and other cultural works that the CPC might
prefer not to have in circulation, the CPC assuredly employs technical means to
combat them. It simply chooses not to deploy them on behalf of foreign movie
producers. One observer has written grandiloquently about the expressive
empowerment possible through piracy:
In China’s cultural system that highly controls its information production and
circulation, piracy not just [sic] provides easier and cheaper access to cultural
goods, but in most cases, piracy offers the only channel for distributing a great
amount of cultural works that are otherwise not allowed to be circulated and
consumed. The Chinese movie audience is denied by China’s tight control
cultural access not just to Hollywood entertainment limited by the tight quota
system but also to a large number of independent domestic films that have
been banned by censorship due to their often challenging political messages
and alternative cultural contents. Piracy often functions as the only channel
through which these censored films can be circulated and consumed. As a viral
distribution circuit that can easily evade censorship, piracy, therefore,
decentralizes the hegemony of state cultural control and potentially empowers
those who are denied the right to access, as well as those who are deprived of

150 See Claire Suddath, Prenda Law, the Porn Copyright Trolls, BLOOMBERG

BUSINESSWEEK (May 30, 2013), http://www.businessweek.com/articles/2013-05-30/prendalaw-the-porn-copyright-trolls.
151 See James Griffiths, A Brief History of Chinese Porn, DANWEI (Aug. 24, 2011),
http://www.danwei.com/a-brief-history-of-chinese-porn/; Brian Ashcraft, What’s Bringing
China and Japan Back Together? Pornography, Apparently, KOTAKU E., http://kota
ku.com/5966171/whats-bringing-china-and-japan-back-together-pornography-apparently; cf.
Christopher Beam, Is All Pornography Banned in China?, SLATE (June 24, 2009),
http://www.slate.com/articles/news_and_politics/explainer/2009/06/they_know_it_when_the
y_see_it.html; Monica Tan, A Land Where Porn “Doesn’t Exist”, DAILY LIFE (Oct. 4, 2012),
http://www.dailylife.com.au/news-and-views/news-features/a-land-where-porn-doesnt-exist20121003-26yiy.html.
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the freedom to create. And this is piracy’s biggest threat, or promise, in the
contemporary cultural landscape of China.152

But it is not clear at all that the observation that piracy “can easily evade
censorship” is correct.153 Additionally, my impression is that pirated works
remain below the government radar more effectively in hard copy form than
online, which would impede the speed and ease of distribution.
As explained above, the Chinese government uses undisclosed formulae to
choose which foreign and domestic films will be allowed into theaters and
authorized circulation. Though some may be rejected because their content is
viewed as potentially culturally destabilizing, most probably fail to make the cut
for much more mundane reasons and are not viewed as socially risky. The CPC
is probably most invested in retaining overall control of commercial film
distribution and likely pays a lot more attention (both observational and
interventionist) to individuals who upload films with the intention of
distributing them, than it does to individual downloaders, especially for
nonthreatening films.
The CPC’s efforts to curtail broad distribution of problematic films
probably include technological tracking and filtering online, and real space
identification and punishment of transgressors. Downloaders of these movies
may be somewhat at risk, though not nearly as much as uploaders and hosts.
Efforts to produce and/or virally distribute civically unacceptable independent
films, whether foreign or domestic, is probably risky for all concerned,
especially when attempted online.154
Governmental monitoring of uploading activity and of web content hosting
that is driven by political considerations could, and most assuredly would,
simultaneously address copyright concerns if, like certain political messages,
copyright infringement was viewed as a threat to social harmony. No dual
censorship/copyright infringement focus by the CPC is in evidence, however.155
Just the opposite. Relevant CPC activities seem focused only upon discouraging
the making of new independent films with anti-government messages, and on
preventing the distribution of currently existing ones. Downloads of these
“dangerous” films may be tracked as well, but downloading is a far less
effective distributional choke point than those offered by uploading and content
hosting websites. My guess is that only people under official observation for

152 Jinying Li, Piracy, Circulation, and Cultural Control in Contemporary China, in 11

INDIA, RUSSIA, CHINA: COMP. STUD. ON EURASIAN CULTURE AND SOC’Y 99, 100 (Tetsuo
Mochizuki & Shiho Maeda eds., 2012), available at http://src-h.slav.hokudai.ac.jp/rp/publi
cations/no11/11-08_Li.pdf.
153 Id.
154 Cf. Kal Raustiala & Christopher Sprigman, Fake It Till You Make It, 92 FOREIGN
AFF. 25, 25–26, 28 (2013), available at http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/139452/kalraustiala-and-christopher-sprigman/fake-it-till-you-make-it.
155 Cf. Brzeski, supra note 139.
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some other reason have their copyright infringing downloads noted in any
official manner.
Massive infringing downloads of unauthorized but “safe” foreign movies
help meet the demand for affordable audiovisual entertainment, and divert
popular contempt for the vapidity of authorized domestic film offerings.156 The
Chinese film industry relies on government subsidies for survival, leading one
commentator to explain that the Chinese “cinema’s position—as both a political
apparatus and a commodity—is a major problem for film producers, as they are
faced with the impossible task of balancing profits with ideology.”157 It’s much
less of a concern for ordinary citizens who have robust unauthorized access to
foreign films online to distract them. They would appear to have little to fear
about engaging in “illegal” downloading or streaming activities their
government has affirmatively chosen not to interfere with. I met many people in
China with enormous libraries of unauthorized copies of foreign films, and none
expressed any concern at all about copyright law.

V. THE APPEARANCE OF CONFLICT MEETS THE APPEARANCE OF FORCE
In July of 2009, after first demonstrating to the world that the Internet could
be instantly turned off across vast swathes of its geography (and cellular phone
service, too!), the PRC began applying preexisting censoring technologies
colloquially referred to as “The Great Firewall of China” and “The Golden
Shield” to block domestic access to social networking sites such as Facebook
and Twitter.158 A journalist writing in the Economist observed:
[W]ithin China’s borders the Communist Party has systematically put in place
projects such as the Great Firewall, which keeps out “undesirable” foreign
websites such as Facebook, Twitter and YouTube, and Golden Shield, which
monitors activities within China. It has also worked closely with trusted
domestic internet companies such as Baidu (a search engine), Tencent (an
internet-services portal), Renren (China’s leading clone of Facebook) and Sina,

156 See Laikwan Pang, Piracy/Privacy: The Despair of Cinema and Collectivity in

China, 31 BOUNDARY 2, no. 3, 2004, at 101, 107 (“Today, the majority of China’s film
companies relies less on the market than on government aid—which ranges from loans and
financial awards to government mass ticket purchasing—for survival. As a result, the films
produced have become more and more compliant with the official ideology, which further
discourages Chinese productions that cater to the tastes and values of the masses.”). But see
the recent success of one domestic movie. Sophie Lu, In Box Office Hit, American Dream Is
Still Alive—in a Maturing China, TEA LEAF NATION (June 10, 2013), http://www.tealeaf
nation.com/2013/06/in-box-office-hit-american-dream-is-still-alive-in-a-maturing-china/.
157 Pang, supra note 156, at 108.
158 Sascha Segan, Life Behind the Great Firewall of China, PCMAG.COM (June 27,
2011),
http://www.pcmag.com/slideshow/story/266213/life-behind-the-great-firewall-ofchina.
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an online media company that includes Weibo, a Twitter-like microblogging
service.159

Though in many respects China enjoys well-functioning domestic
substitutes to Western social media platforms (Weibo, QQ, Weixin, Baidu,
etc.), Chinese people are well aware of what they are missing (Facebook,
Twitter, Google and others). The technologist who developed the Great Firewall
is by one account among the most hated men in China.160 When Fang Binxing
announced his resignation from his post as the president of the Beijing
University of Posts and Telecommunication as a result of health concerns,
online comments about his resignation were very hostile.161
By far, the most popular comments that have been shared by thousands of
netizens on Weibo (China’s Twitter) are “Wish the illness can defeat you
ASAP!” and “We are glad that you are gone [for good]!” Like one netizen
cursed: “I hope Fang gets cancer and die [sic] soon.” Another netizen
V made a similar wish: “May the illness take his life ASAP. All
netizens are on the side of the illness. Please, take his life!”162
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China’s “real name” Internet policy clearly prohibits anonymous web use,
even though it has not been widely enforced. However, as far as I have been
able to ascertain, there is no statutory law that illegalizes the use of blocked
159 China’s Internet: A Giant Cage, ECONOMIST (Apr. 6, 2013), http://www.econom

ist.com/news/special-report/21574628-internet-was-expected-help-democratise-china-inste
ad-it-has-enabled; see also Ke Steven Wan, Internet Service Providers’ Vicarious Liability
Versus Regulation of Copyright Infringement in China, 2011 U. ILL. J.L. TECH. & POL’Y 375,
398–99 (“There are two levels of censorship of Internet speech. First, the Chinese
government controls what its citizens can see by filtering out information flowing through
the Internet gateway, which connects China with the outside world. Second, because the
Internet gateway does not prevent access to content already inside a domestic network, the
Chinese government relies on the cooperation of regional ISPs to filter information that does
not have to pass through the Internet gateway. The most prevalent forms of Internet filtering
include Internet Protocol (‘IP’) address blocking and content filtering. IP address blocking
refers to preventing users from accessing specific IP addresses. This would prohibit users
from accessing any content on the blocked site whether or not the content is objectionable.
Content filtering, however, is more finely grained and prohibits users from accessing any
site containing certain keywords, phrases, or even images. The filtering technology can even
allow the government to detect the forbidden words or other ‘content’ within the IP packets
travelling between users’ computers and targeted sites. Since the Chinese government spares
no effort to regulate the Internet speech, an additional task of deterring copyright
infringement should not dramatically increase the administrative costs.”).
160 Father of the Great Fire Wall Resigns Due to Deteriorating Health, Chinese
Netizens Wish Him an Early Death, OFFBEAT CHINA (June 27, 2013, 8:05 PM), http://offbeat
china.com/father-of-the-great-fire-wall-resigns-due-to-deteriorating-health-chinese-netizenswish-him-an-early-death.
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foreign social networking sites. China tries to prevent access to them but does
not officially forbid it. Recent reports suggest that despite the technological
blocks in place, hundreds of thousands of Chinese citizens and domiciliaries are
able to access (e.g.) Facebook regularly from inside China, and this author is
one of them. I do it by using a Virtual Private Network (VPN), which at least in
theory shields my computer activities from observation by my in-country ISP.
While it would be nice to think I outsmarted the Chinese censorship machinery,
VPNs are not exactly cutting edge and I feel confident that the CPC is aware
they exist, and that they are being widely used within China. The legality of
using VPNs there is murky, but if they were clearly forbidden, companies
would not have any mechanism for engaging in what they believe are at least
somewhat secure online communications, or for accessing blocked international
pages they value, and they would leave China. For this reason, VPNs are
tolerated. They may also be compromised, however; the Chinese government
has a huge appetite for Internet surveillance and for the technological facility to
spy undetectably. The functional privacy that VPNs actually offer users is
contested. My own impression is that VPN users have a false sense of security.
If VPNs are legally banned or it becomes evident that even sophisticated ones
are easily breachable and often breached, the only semi-secure, semi-free online
communications channel in China will be lost, and that would have far ranging
repercussions for the Chinese economy.

VI. CONCLUSION
At present, the CPC is “allowing its citizens to benefit from the social and
commercial aspects of the Internet, while placing strict limits on its use for
political activism.”163 Chinese leaders do not consider the Internet an
unstoppable force for openness and democracy, so it will not be banned or
restricted into disutility. In fact, quite the contrary: Various government organs
are trying to harness the power of social networking overtly, by communicating
with citizens online, and covertly through mechanisms like astroturfing and
search engine optimization. Meanwhile, macro concerns about political control
and individual concerns about reputation simultaneously drive widespread
online monitoring and censorship by the CPC.
Everyone is aware of the high level of involvement the CPC has with online
communications. As a result, VPNs are commonly deployed inside China.
Some Internet users in China push back against it overtly, using the social
media platforms available to them, while others try to evade monitoring and
censorship by aggressively using technology or subterfuge or both in

163 How Does China Censor the Internet?, supra note 81; cf. Rachel Lu, Could One

Chinese City Cut a Small Hole in the Great Firewall?, TEA LEAF NATION (June 5, 2013),
http://www.tealeafnation.com/2013/06/could-one-chinese-city-cut-a-small-hole-in-the-greatfirewall/.
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combination. None of this is technically illegal but efforts to limit online
monitoring and filtering are unofficially battled quite effectively by the CPC.
At the same time, the Chinese government refuses to use its vast
surveillance and control capabilities in the service of foreign copyright holders.
This allows foreign entertainment products including books, movies, music and
television programming to be widely distributed throughout China, even when
they are officially censored or unauthorized, at low to no cost or risk to Chinese
citizens. The CPC sees these media materials as opiates of the masses, rather
than intellectual resources that are likely to spark revolution or dissent, and they
are tacitly permitted to be consumed in great quantity as well as in relative
privacy.
Much of the active governmental surveillance in China is directed at
promulgating the CPC conception of social harmony. To effectuate this vision,
only politically uncomfortable communications are sought out for censoring and
silencing. This is sometimes done openly; other times it is at least detectable,
and there is also the risk of silent listening. These activities are intended to
hamper political activism and repress dissent, and they do. But they also prevent
business entities from having either confidential communications or confidence
in communications. Their negotiations, contracts, business activities, personal
ledgers, trade secrets and financial information are constantly exposed to
government agents. This would be problematic even if all CPC leaders were
completely honest because business interests are sometimes in conflict with
those of the government. When the well-documented tendency toward
corruption of CPC minions is factored in164 and the possibility exists that
confidential information will be passed along to competitors, the situation
becomes completely untenable for some ventures, hampering innovation
generally and particularly repressing the ascension of Shanghai as a world
financial center.165
A New York Times reporter has recently observed, “China, the world’s
second-largest economy after the United States, has a huge influence on the
world economy so the actions of its central bank are closely watched across the
globe. But its financial and banking system remains opaque to Chinese and
foreigners alike.”166 To grow this sector of its economy, China will need to
simultaneously provide enough transparency for potential investors to have
basic understanding of how Chinese markets operate, and adequate
transactional privacy so that the same potential investors feel confident that they
can keep their proprietary financial information sufficiently confidential. The
CPC must balance demands for privacy with its longstanding concerns about
164 See Chris Buckley, China Answers One Question About Trial: A Date, N.Y. TIMES,
Aug. 18, 2013, http://www.nytimes.com/2013/08/19/world/asia/chinese-politician-to-standtrial-for-corruption.html?_r=0.
165 WANG, supra note 43, at 24.
166 David Barboza, Credit Warnings Offer World a Peek into China’s Secretive Banks,
N.Y. TIMES, June 24, 2013, http://www.nytimes.com/2013/06/25/business/global/creditwarnings-give-world-a-peek-into-chinas-secretive-banks.html?hp&_r=1&.
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social stability and personal anxieties about status, power and surreptitious
wealth accumulation. Its successes and failures will be measured by future
trends in foreign investment as well as by the openness and vibrancy of
domestic Chinese artistic and political culture.

